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Research Study

Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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NATIONALISM IN SOVIET UKRAINE

by

In the preparation of this study, the Office of Political Research consulted other offices of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State. Their comments and suggestions were appreciated and used, but no attempt at formal coordination was undertaken. Further comments will be welcomed by the author



DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union is a multi-national state in an age of nationalism. Of the three great European land empires of the nineteenth century—the Austrian, Turkish, and Russian—only the Russian is still intact. Although the vital signs of the Soviet empire remain strong, many of its national minorities—which number over a hundred, and make up almost half of the Soviet population—continue to resist Russification pressures, and some of them are becoming more rather than less assertive. Accordingly, the nationalities question is one of the most persistent and vexing domestic problems confronting Soviet authorities today.

Some Western students of Soviet society, influenced by Marxist and in part by liberal modes of thought, as well as by the dominance of Russians in the first generation of American academic Sovietologists, have been slow to recognize the staying power of Soviet minority nationalism. Predisposed to believe in an historical trend toward increasing cultural uniformity and political centralization, having faith in the power of social engineering to obliterate old loyalties, they long regarded nationalism as an atavism, an obsolete and even embarrassing throwback to an earlier era. More recently, as many conflicts in Soviet society continued to be ethnic rather than class conflicts, the academic pendulum has swung in the other direction. Scholars are attempting to make up for their tardiness in recognizing the import of the nationalities problem with zeal in exposing its current dimensions. Nationalities studies have come in vogue. Today there is some danger that the understatement born of misinterpretation will be replaced by an overstatement born of enthusiastic attention to the woes of ethnic minorities everywhere. Consequently, there is more than ever room for judicious consideration of whether the Soviet Union is a "melting pot" or a "boiling pot."

Since the major Soviet nationalities potentially form political pressure groups, a study of the nationalities question is also germane to the debate concerning the nature of the Soviet system and the direction in which it may evolve in the future—whether toward increased "totalitarianism" in the political, economic, and cultural spheres, or toward a more federal, diversified and pluralistic system. Thus far, to the extent that Soviet leaders have pursued a long-range goal in nationality policy, they have engaged in "nation-building," in the attempt to transform the old multi-national Russian empire into a Soviet "nation" whose citizens, regardless of nationality, owe their primary loyalty to the Soviet state. In many respects the dilemma of the Soviet leader is that of the imperial statesman of all times and all places. To require complete cultural uniformity, as well as political and economic centralization across the board, may stir up unrest among nationalities which could be mollified by more generous attention to their individual needs, but to yield too much to local interests may encourage particularist attitudes which likewise threaten the stability of the state.

Thus, the history of central policy toward the national minorities has not been one of unrelieved repression, but rather a blend of coercive and conciliatory measures. The fluctuations of Soviet nationality policy probably do not reflect any change in basic objectives, but merely the use of more or less subtle means to achieve the same end. It is possible that, if ideological imperatives continue to weaken, the regime might become more responsive to the desires of certain key national minorities to retain their ethnic and cultural identity, and to gain some measure of economic and political autonomy within the Soviet system. It is more likely, however, that the leadership would seek an alternate base, perhaps traditional Russian nationalism or economic integration, on which to build a unitary state.

This paper is a case study of nationalist tendencies among the Ukrainians—the largest and most influential Soviet national minority. It estimates the extent to which centrifugal and destabilizing forces

exist in the Ukraine and evaluates Moscow's efforts to contain them. The Ukrainians possess characteristics which, taken together, give them a unique position among Soviet minorities. Some of these features—the size and cohesiveness of the Ukrainian population, the economic significance of their area, the historical longevity of the Ukraine as a distinct ethnic community conscious of an independent cultural heritage, and the Ukrainian's historic susceptibility to Western cultural influences—would seem to increase the ability of the Ukrainians to resist Russification pressures. Yet other factors—particularly the considerable affinity (linguistic, ethnic, cultural) among Russians and Ukrainians—may work in the opposite direction. Soviet authorities tend to accept Ukrainians, fellow Slavs, on an almost equal footing with Russians in elite recruitment, and under Khrushchev and Brezhnev the Ukrainian Communist Party has enjoyed a privileged position. Yet the similarity between Ukrainians and Russians may also make central authorities—believing that the Ukrainians are more easily assimilable than many other nationalities—less inclined to accord Ukrainians rights as a group.

This paper appraises Ukrainian nationalism on several levels. First, the character of the Ukrainian nationality and the question of how fully the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian Party have been integrated into the Soviet system is considered. Second, a review of linguistic and demographic trends in the Ukraine indicates the speed and extent of Russification there. Finally, an examination of nationalist dissent among Ukrainian intellectuals, and of nationalist manifestations within the Ukrainian Communist Party, suggests the extent and nature of resistance to central control.

II. THE PLACE OF THE UKRAINE IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM

A. The Ukrainian Nation

Soviet Ukraine is more than an administrative subdivision. The 41 million Ukrainians in the Soviet Union form the largest national minority in the country and account for 17 percent of its population. The Ukraine itself contains 47 million people (over 17 percent of the Soviet population), of which 35 million are ethnic Ukrainians. In area and population the Ukraine is about the size of France. Its people possess all the attributes of a nation: a common language, ethnic distinctness, geographic and economic cohesion, and consciousness of a shared heritage. The vitality of Ukrainian nationalism and the ability of the Ukrainians to resist assimilation depend on the strength of these qualities.

As much as any republic in the Soviet Union, the Ukraine possesses the basis for a self-sufficient economy. It serves both as a granary and a major mineral producer of the Soviet Union. Among its mineral resources, the primary raw materials for heavy metallurgy are most important. Scarcely anywhere else in the Soviet Union are coal, iron, and manganese found in such proximity as in the East Ukraine. In addition to the rich coal deposits in the Donets Basin, or Donbas, another coalfield has been discovered in the Lvov region. Krivoy Rog in the Dnepropetrovsky region produces iron ore of a high quality, and manganese is found in the middle Dnepr area. The Donbas has extensive salt and mercury deposits. Vast natural gas resources have been discovered in East Ukraine. Petroleum fields lie in several eastern regions, in the Crimea, and in the foothills of the Carpathians, where potash is also found. In addition, the Ukraine produces about one quarter of the Soviet Union's grain, as well as sugar beets and a variety of other crops.

The Ukraine has well-developed and diversified industries. In 1965 the Ukraine produced more pig-iron than any European country, more steel than the United Kingdom or France, and was second only to the United Kingdom in coal mining. The Ukraine leads the world in per capita production of iron, steel, and iron ore. Its chemical industry has expanded rapidly since the 1950s and it is the major heavy-machine construction center of the Soviet Union. The Ukraine also produces some aluminum, about two-thirds of the country's sugar and half its salt.

The part played by the Ukraine in the Soviet economy is considerable. On balance, it contributes more to the Soviet exchequer than it receives from it, although the costs of administration and defense borne by the all-union government tend to even the score. Although the Ukraine's light industry is underdeveloped, and it imports cloth, lumber, and some other products from other parts of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine has escaped the narrow regional

specialization which has been forced on some union republics. Confined for half a century within a closed economy and unable to reach foreign markets directly, the Ukraine has become to a certain degree welded economically to the other regions of the Soviet Union, but its economy is relatively balanced and has become less reliant on the traditional surpluses of coal, iron and steel, and grain. If cut loose from the all-union economy, the economy of the Ukraine could probably stay afloat.

While the economic importance of their area and the sheer weight of their numbers give the Ukrainians a strength lesser Soviet nationalities lack, the similarity of Ukrainians to Russians doubtless gives Soviet authorities some grounds for hope that Russification may ultimately solve the Ukrainian problem. Little Russians (Ukrainians), White Russians (Belorussians), and Great Russians make up the three branches of the East Slav family. The acculturation of the Ukrainians may be more feasible, for example, than the absorption of the Baltic nationalities.

In assessing the ability of the Ukrainians to retain their national identity in the face of Russifying pressures, however, it is necessary to make a distinction between East Ukrainians and West Ukrainians. In modern times the Ukraine has never formed an independent political state (except during the brief and confused period following the Bolshevik Revolution), and its territories have often been divided among several states. Only with the territorial acquisitions of World War II were all Ukrainian territories consolidated in one Soviet republic. East Ukraine, most of which has belonged to the Russian or Soviet empire during most of the modern period, is closer to the Great Russians in historical traditions and in cultural and religious background than is West Ukraine, which was annexed only during World War II.

West Ukraine, encompassing the seven provinces annexed by the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1945, by virtue of its border location and history has long been more Western-oriented than the eastern part of the republic. Five of the western oblasts, those which make up Eastern Galicia (Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, and Ternopol oblasts) and part of Volynia (Volynia and Rovno oblasts) were under Austrian or Polish rule for centuries, although the Volynian areas had been under Russian rule from the eighteenth century until World War I. Transcarpathia (Ruthenia), acquired by the Soviets from Czechoslovakia, was under Hungarian control until World War I. Chernovtsy, formerly called Northern Bukovina, belonged to Romania until World War II.

While East Ukraine contains no sizeable minority except for the Russians, West Ukraine hosts two significant minorities. Most of the Poles in Eastern Galicia were deported to Poland after the war, but Hungarians constitute 14 percent of the population of Transcarpathia, while Romanians and the closely-related Moldavians make up 19 percent of Chernovtsy. At the same time, Czechoslovakia and Poland contain small but vocal Ukrainian minorities. This intermingling of nationalities creates a potentially troublesome situation in the Soviet Ukraine. Nationalist movements in Eastern Europe could spark repercussions in the Ukraine itself, as happened during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 (see page 22).

West Ukraine's religion has also helped to set it apart from the rest of Ukraine. Most of the Christians in West Ukraine, except for Volynia and Chernovtsy, are Uniates, Greek Catholics who adhere to the Orthodox rite but recognize Rome's authority, while the great mass of East Ukrainian believers are Orthodox. The Uniate church has traditionally been a bearer of Ukrainian national feeling. The church's intimate connection with the Ukrainian independence movement during World War II provided the pretext for its official dissolution by Moscow in 1946. A nationalist Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church did exist and was intermittently active in East Ukraine from 1921 until its final suppression during World War II, but it never commanded as much popular support as the Uniates in West Ukraine. The officially sanctioned Russian Orthodox Church is subservient to the state, which has relied on it in the struggle with the "national" churches in the East as well as the West.

In the East Ukraine, Ukrainian national feelings have traditionally been stronger in the north, particularly in the northwestern regions (Khmelnitsky, Vinnitsa, Zhitomir, Kiev, Cherkassy, Poltava). Part of this northwestern territory was acquired by Russia only in the late eighteenth century. The south, which contains most of the large cities, was settled

much later, and has historically had a less Ukrainian character. Yet as a whole the East Ukraine shares much of its long history with the Great Russians.

Because of its closer physical proximity and closer cultural ties to Europe, however, even while under Russian rule the East Ukraine has played a distinctive role in the development of the Russian state—as a conveyor of Western influences. Peter the Great, for example, relied heavily on Ukrainian advisors and ideas in his effort to Westernize Russia in the eighteenth century. The Ukraine is important in Russian history for another related reason. To some nineteenth century liberals—both Russian and Ukrainian—the early history of the Ukraine represented the quest for freedom and the defiance of the centralized autocratic state. This conception of Ukraine's historical role can be seen in the interpretation of two events, both of which have sparked fierce disputes between contemporary Soviet Russian and Ukrainian historians. At issue is not merely a dry, academic matter, but the identity of a people.

The first event concerns the destruction of the first "Russian" state, centered on Kiev in the Dnepr River Valley in the early middle ages. Western in outlook and in its political system, the Kievan state prospered until the Tatar invasion of the thirteenth century. For the next 200 years much of the old Kievan territories were subjected to the Tatar yoke, but parts of Ukraine (Galicia and Volynia) were absorbed by Poland and Lithuania. When a new state to the north, Muscovy, rose to drive out the Tatar intruders and "gather the Russian lands," it differed from its Kievan predecessor substantially: in its territorial base, in its political system, even in its ethnic make-up. Russian historians have stressed the continuity between the Kievan and Muscovite periods, and view much of Russian foreign policy in the centuries to come as a continuing effort to reclaim the Ukrainian territories as a legitimate part of the Russian state. Ukrainian historians, on the contrary, have seen the Tatar invasion as marking a sharp break and are inclined to regard Moscow's eventual annexation of the East Ukraine as a conquest of one separate people by another, rather than a family reunion.

Another cherished Ukrainian memory is of the period of Cossack freedom. The Cossacks were bands of free-wheeling trappers and mercenaries who lived in several areas not yet brought under the sway of the expanding Muscovite state. Those in the no-man's land along the lower reaches of the Dnepr formed a community—the Zaporozhian Sich—governed by a rough democracy and serving as a sanctuary for runaway serfs and others who wanted to escape governmental oppression. While the Ukrainians idealize the Zaporozhian Cossacks as free spirits who defied the Tsars, Soviet historians attempt to uncover evidence of class conflict in the egalitarian Cossack society, and regard the "unification" (or subjugation) of the Cossack lands with the Tsarist state as a blessing for the Ukraine.

The Ukrainians have romanticized their history somewhat, yet the "myth" of the Ukrainians of old as a proud and freedom-loving people has survived to provide Ukrainians today with national heroes, a national ideal, and a conception of national character. Years of Soviet education, which subtly emphasizes the superiority of things Russian, have taken their toll, but have not completely destroyed the Ukrainians' appreciation and knowledge of their own national culture and history.

B. The Ukraine's Status Vis-à-vis the Union

Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the Ukrainians have achieved the status of "second among equals" of Soviet nationalities. A policy of "recruiting local cadres" to govern the Ukraine, first employed during the 1920s as part of the effort of *korenizatsiya* ("taking root" or "nativization") has been revived. The Ukrainian Party, composed of these indigenous but obedient apparatchiks, has been elevated to the position of the Russian Party's junior partner. At the same time, Ukrainians appear to be granted virtually equal vocational opportunities, as the central regime attempts to strengthen the bonds of interest among elites of different nationalities and weaken bonds among different social groups within the same nationality. As a result of these policies, a native Communist elite governs the Ukraine; the Ukraine today is no longer a colonial outpost run by Great Russians.

Since World War II the Ukrainian Party has become almost completely Ukrainized. Beginning with the Khrushchev era and continuing until 1972, the

Figure 2

Ukrainian Representation in the Ukrainian Communist Party



Ukrainian Party experienced a remarkable spurt of growth, although its membership is still disproportionately low compared with the all-union average. During this period of growth, many local cadres were recruited, and today indigenous participation in the Ukrainian Party is higher than in most union republics. The Ukrainian representation in the Ukrainian Party rose from 60 percent in 1958 to 75 percent in 1972, as high as the Ukrainian share of the population of Ukraine. During this period the Russian element in the Party fell from 28 percent to 19 percent, although the Russian share of the population of the Ukraine was growing.[1]

Ukrainians dominate the upper echelons as well as the rank and file of the Ukrainian Party. While in almost all other union republics Russians serve as second secretaries, important posts because of their control over cadres, since 1953 both the first and the second secretaries of the Ukrainian Party have been ethnic Ukrainians. Of the eleven full members of the present Ukrainian Politburo, only one is Russian. Of the twenty-four first secretaries of Ukrainian oblast (province) Party committees (obkoms) whose nationality can be ascertained, twenty are ethnic Ukrainians (there are twenty-five committees). Moreover, many of the Russians in high positions in the Ukrainian apparat are natives or long-time residents who have risen through the ranks of the Ukrainian apparat, not Muscovite intendants imposed on the native elite from outside. The four obkom first secretaries in the Ukraine known to be ethnic Russians, for example, all appear to be either natives of the area, or to have lived there for many years.[2]

There has, however, been a general tendency to appoint East Ukrainians, presumably more trustworthy, to fill important posts in West Ukraine.[3] Party membership is also considerably lower in the western oblasts. None of the seven western oblasts have as many as forty Party members per one thousand people. All but two of the eighteen eastern oblasts have at least forty Party members per one thousand people.[4] The higher percentage of Russians residing in the eastern oblasts may be partly responsible for this difference.

The high level of native participation in the Ukrainian Party is partly due merely to the socioeconomic advancement of the Ukraine, which has increased the size of the native elite. It also reflects the growing acceptance of the Communist regime by part of the Ukrainian elite, whether for reasons of conviction or convenience. In a sense, it is not that a Ukrainian elite has captured control of the Ukrainian Party, but that the Ukrainian Party has captured the allegiance of a Ukrainian elite. But the increasing tendency to give responsible positions to Ukrainians also indicates that the central leadership no longer distrusts the Ukrainian Party as a rival power center, as Stalin did, but regards the Ukrainian Communists as reliable partners.

Graduates of the Ukrainian apparat also occupy important positions in central Party and government institutions, although this is partly an historical accident and has little effect on the center's policy toward the Ukraine.[5] Khrushchev, a former First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party, naturally filled key posts in Moscow and elsewhere with old cronies and

clients from the Ukrainian Party. Brezhnev, one of these Khrushchev proteges, continued this practice on a reduced scale. Four of the fifteen full members of the Politburo—Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Podgorny, and Polyansky—spent their early careers in the Ukrainian Party. Shcherbitsky, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party, is also a full member, and another, Grechko, is an ethnic Ukrainian.

Of Politburo members from the Ukrainian apparat, Brezhnev and Kirilenko are ethnic Russians, although Brezhnev was born in the Ukraine and Kirilenko, who has a Ukrainian name, in an RSFSR oblast bordering it. The nationality of the "Ukrainians" on the Politburo is not very significant in any case. They all belong to a Russified, or at least denationalized, apparat. During the early years of the Khrushchev era these Politburo members at times seemed to form a political grouping with a common policy orientation, but at least by 1960, with the removal of Kirichenko from the Politburo, the so-called "Ukrainian clique" began to break up and thereafter showed little cohesion on issues. After Khrushchev's removal, the rivalry between Brezhnev and Podgorny, and later, the demotions of Polyansky and Shelest, further demonstrated that the "Ukrainians" on the Politburo did not comprise a united group. After long years away from their original power base, most of them had developed new constituencies and allies.

Today the "old school tie" of the "Ukrainians" operates largely on the social level, with little carryover into politics. In fact, reliance on differing power bases in the Ukrainian Party often has created frictions rather than political compatibility among the "Ukrainians." The rivalry between Podgorny and Brezhnev, and that between Brezhnev and Shelest had its roots in earlier factional alignments in the Ukraine, so that politics at the center has sometimes appeared to be a continuation of Ukrainian power politics on a magnified scale.

The "Ukrainians," initially owing their positions not to any quota system institutionalizing Ukrainian representation on the Politiburo but to their personal ties to Khrushchev or Brezhnev, do not appear to represent the interests of the Ukraine. Consequently, except in the matter of patronage, the fact of heavy Ukrainian representation on the Politburo does not imply special treatment or advantages for the Ukraine. More significant is the fact that the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party, who does represent Ukrainian interests and answers to a Ukrainian constituency, has an *ex officio* place on the Politburo. Since 1953 the Party boss of the Ukraine has always sat on the Politburo. At present one other union republic first secretary is a full member of the Politburo, but only the Ukraine has been regularly represented at that level on what appears to be intended as a permanent basis.

The Ukraine is somewhat under-represented in the CPSU Central Committee, making up 15.6 percent of the members and candidate members elected at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in 1971, while the population of the Ukraine makes up 19.5 percent of the total Soviet population. Membership elected at the three previous congresses, spanning the period from 1956 to 1966, had shown a gradual increase in representation for the Ukrainian Party, which reached its peak at the Twenty-third Congress, at which the Ukraine provided 16.4 percent of the membership. The fall in Ukrainian representation may reflect in part the troubles of Petr Shelest, ousted as First Secretary of the Ukraine in 1972, but the discrimination at the Twenty-fourth Congress appeared to be systematic. While only twelve of the twenty-five obkom first secretaries of the Ukraine were elected to the Central Committee, all but two of the sixty-five first secretaries of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) obkoms and autonomous republics (ASSRs) were given seats. Representation of Ukrainian oblasts appeared to be based on population or on the size of the oblast Party organization, while RSFSR oblasts were represented regardless of the size of their populations. With the single exception of Ivano-Frankovsk, whose first secretary at the time was from Dneprodzerzhinsk, Brezhnev's hometown, all Ukrainian oblasts with less then 1.7 million people were denied representation. Those oblasts with between 1.7 and 2.3 million inhabitants were represented by candidate members, and those with over 2.3 million by full members. Yet forty-two of the RSFSR oblasts and ASSRs represented on the Central Committee were "rotten" oblasts; that is, they had populations smaller than the 1.7 million seemingly required for Ukrainian oblasts. In addition, whether measured by a popula-

tion standard or by the size of regional Party organizations, the Ukraine's representation lagged behind that of most other non-Russian republics. Still, in absolute terms the Ukraine has not done badly. A larger percentage of Ukrainian oblasts were represented by full members on the Central Committee than those of any other republic except for the RSFSR.[6] And the greater representation for RSFSR oblasts may be due to the lack of a union republic party organization for the RSFSR rather than to nationality considerations.

Although the Ukrainian union republic is underrepresented on the Central Committee, the Ukrainian nationality is over-represented. Ethnic Ukrainians made up 18.6 percent of the Central Committee membership, but only 16.9 percent of the Soviet population.[7] This is because, besides the Ukrainians serving in Party and government posts at the center and in the Ukraine, a number of Ukrainians have attained positions in other regions which merit Central Committee membership. Ukrainians, like Russians, are employed in key managerial and command positions throughout the Soviet Union—evidence that they are not discriminated against. In 1966 Russians and Ukrainians were the only two nationalities to hold obkom first secretaryships outside their own republics.[8] Today at least eight obkom first secretaries in the RSFSR and two in Kazakhstan are Ukrainians.[9] Ukrainians appear to be used interchangeably with Russians to bolster central control in Central Asia. According to one Soviet commentator, "in the eyes of the Kazakh, the Tatar, the Kirghiz, the Turkman, or the Uzbek, the Ukrainian or the Belorussian are to an equal degree 'Russian.'"[10] An exception to this general lack of formal discrimination are the preferential nationality quotas of all-union universities. These quotas favor Asian nationalities over Ukrainians and other Europeans except, of course, for the Russians.

Within their own republic Ukrainians are underrepresented in several occupational elites. In 1965, for example, Ukrainians made up only 61 percent of the enrollment in Ukrainian universities,[11] and in 1974 under half of the scientists in the Ukraine holding doctoral degrees were Ukrainians.[12] The Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukraine, on the other hand, has been Ukrainized along with the Party. In 1971 fourteen out of sixteen bishops were native Ukrainians.[13]

It is doubtful that the heavy representation of Russians in key elites in the Ukraine is the result of deliberate policy as much as it is a reflection of the employment and educational opportunities enjoyed by all urban residents. The Russians, largely concentrated in the major cities of the Ukraine, reap these advantages to the fullest. At the same time, in some cases the regime does disperse Ukrainian elites throughout the USSR, with the avowed intent of fostering their "internationalization." About one-fourth of all Ukrainian professionals work outside the Ukraine.[14] Ukrainians living outside the Ukraine, who comprise one-eighth of the total Ukrainian population of the Soviet Union, may account for the bulk of those working outside the Ukraine. To the extent that the center does engage in a conscious policy of cross-posting, this has the effect of artificially increasing the opportunities which the Russian city dweller in the Ukraine would enjoy even under "free market" conditions.

The fact that Ukrainians have taken control of the Ukrainian Party does not mean that the Ukrainian SSR has gained any significant degree of political autonomy. As long as Moscow controls promotions and demotions within the Ukrainian Party, the Party—whatever its ethnic composition—will remain a serving elite rather than a ruling elite. As long as policy for the Ukraine is made by the Soviet Politburo, whatever the career opportunities for individual Ukrainians, as a collective they will be powerless. Yet the existence of the union republic government should not be written off completely. Like the nineteenth-century *zemstvo*,* it could provide the nucleus around which an opposition to the central government could form.[15]

III. RUSSIFICATION AND ITS FRUITS

A. The Brezhnev Years: Toward a Unitary State

Currently the leadership is conducting a "forward" policy toward nationalist heresies. In the middle 1960s, during the transitional period after Khrushchev's removal, some slippage of central control

*A unit of local self-government which had limited powers but which attracted liberal reformers.

occurred. Several regional party bosses moved to maximize their authority at a time when central vigilance was relaxed slightly. As the leadership headed by Brezhnev consolidated its position at the center, however, it moved to re-establish central hegemony over the hinterlands.[16] By the early 1970s the erosion of discipline was arrested, and signs appeared that structural changes to reduce the powers of union republics further were under consideration. Duing Brezhnev's tenure the themes of economic centralization, the amalgamation of nationalities, and "Soviet patriotism" have been touted,* and given point by the decision to draw up a long-term economic plan for the period from 1976 to 1990.

Brezhnev's major statement on nationalities policy was delivered at the December 1972 celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet Union's formation.[17] In this speech he capsulated his policy in several dogmas, not all of them new but all given new and authoritative emphasis: that the Soviet economy forms a unified, organic whole; that regional economic parity has been achieved; that the "drawing together" of nationalities has become a leading tendency. Commentary by other official spokesmen on these issues registers some disagreement, but shows an overall trend toward a centralizing, Russifying policy.

Brezhnev formulated the economic relationship of the Soviet republics as follows:

> The economy of the Soviet Union is not a sum total of the economies of the individual republics and regions. It has long since become one economic organism, formed on the basis of the common economic aims and interests of all our nations and nationalities.

The corollary of economic interdependence is regional specialization. By advancing this theme, Brezhnev served notice to union republic leaders that efforts to achieve regional economic autarky would not be tolerated.

*It is true that some experiments in economic decentralization have also been permitted. But decentralization does not necessarily augment the powers of the union republics. The creation of economic management organs with horizontal rather than vertical competence, having jurisdiction over one industry in more than one union republic, may undercut the authority of union republic administrators. In some cases Khrushchev's national economic councils (*sovnarkhozy*) had this effect, and the production associations, officially sanctioned in 1973, may evolve in the same direction.

Brezhnev's speech also seemed to signal an end to preferential treatment for backward regions. The equalization of regional economic development had long been a stated goal of Soviet economic policy. Although in practice this objective had often yielded to the goal of maximizing national economic growth, it had never been abandoned altogether. Thus, the eighth and ninth Five-Year Plans, spanning the period from 1966 to 1975, favored some of the Central Asian republics at the expense of the more industrialized Western republics. In 1970, a typical year in this respect, the RSFSR, Ukraine, Estonia, and Latvia all retained less than 37 percent of the revenue from the turnover tax collected within their borders.* Several months before the fiftieth anniversary an authoritative article written by Podgorny appeared which indicated that new criteria would henceforth govern resource allocations, that the particular economic needs of individual republics would be subordinated to all-union interests.[19]

At the fiftieth anniversary celebration Brezhnev endorsed this view. He announced that since "the problem of levelling the economic development of the national republics had on the whole been resolved," the government was now "able to approach economic questions, first and foremost, from the point of view of the interests of the state as a whole, from the standpoint of raising the efficiency of the entire national economy of the USSR." Lenin had always maintained that economic inequities were the root of the Soviet nationalities problem. By putting forth the fiction that regional parity had now been attained, Brezhnev was reinforcing his contention that the nationality problem had been solved. He was also attempting to curtail the brokering of regional interests at the center, and providing a theoretical justification for an intensified effort to develop Russian Siberia. The use of economic efficiency as the main criterion for future investment might have been expected to redound to the benefit of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Georgia, where the productivity of labor and capital inputs has grown most rapidly. Instead, more capital is being pumped into the Eastern RSFSR. High priority continues to be given to the development of

*Much of the investment in Central Asia, however, was poured into extractive industries, which did little to promote regional development.[18]

the Tyumen oil industry, to the neglect of the Ukraine's coal industry, and in March 1974 a major program to develop the non-black-soil land of the RSFSR was inaugurated. This may reflect, in part, a planner's preference for exploiting the vast natural resource base in the eastern regions, even at the cost of initially high investment allocations, rather than a policy of deliberate discrimination against the Ukraine and other regions.

The hoopla about a unified economy may be connected with yet another announcement Brezhnev made—that the draft of a new constitution, long in the works but rarely mentioned since 1966—would be made public before the next Party Congress, scheduled for February 1976. In the scholarly discussion concerning possible constitutional changes which followed Brezhnev's disclosure, proposals were made for altering administrative boundaries to match economic rather than nationality lines, thus reviving a debate which has surfaced periodically since the 1920s. A suggestion to this effect was set forth most explicitly in articles by Gosplan official Viktor Kistanov.[20] An authoritative article in 1973 written by Eduard Bagramov, a leading theoretician on nationality matters and deputy chief editor of *Kommunist*, was more cautious but agreed that "naturally, in some cases, as has been the case in the past, because of, above all, economic expediency . . . some changes may be made in the boundaries between union republics." He went on to inform his readers that "Marxists must not base their actions entirely and exclusively on the 'national-territorial' principle."[21] In 1973 articles in various journals[22] suggested that territorial units based on ethnic lines were becoming obsolete or, alternatively, advocated constitutional changes to make union republic laws conform more closely to all-union legislation. Jurist P.G. Semenov called for the complete abolition of union republic "autonomy."

Boundary changes which ignore union republic lines would threaten the power of local leaders, as well as offend national sensitivities. Previous centralized Party administrative organizations that were established to control regional areas, such as the short-lived Central Asian Bureau and the Transcaucasian Bureau, which Khrushchev created in the early 1960s, ran up against local vested interests. The current leadership would approach any such changes with caution.

Definite action has been taken, however, to restrict the jurisdiction of regional governments. All-union and union-republic ministries have increased in number and competence, while the trend has been toward a reduction of republic ministries.[23] In the past, the complexity of Soviet administrative law, a confused web of overlapping jurisdictions, had given skillful local leaders some room for manuever. The elimination of republic ministries, which are freer from central interference than union-republic ministries,* would clarify the subordinate position of local authorities.

Formulas concerning the evolution of the nationalities have also been manipulated to reinforce the centralizing trend in recent years. In the Khrushchev era the premise was propagated that a process of "drawing together" was taking place, which would lead to a "merger" of all nationalities. After Khrushchev the concept of "merger" was consigned to a distant future after the worldwide victory of socialism and emphasis was placed on a dual process of "flowering" and "drawing together," which delicately balanced the concept of assimilation and increasing uniformity with that of the free development of each nationality.

These two processes had generally been treated as coequal until 1972; whether nationalities "flower" through "drawing together" or "draw together" through "flowering" had never been clarified. But several articles in 1972 seemed to argue that "drawing together" had become the primary tendency. Masherov, a candidate member of the Politburo and head of the Belorussian Party, carried this argument further than anyone, by reviving the notion that "merging" was already taking place. Contending that it was incorrect to assume that "merging" could take place only after a lengthy stage of development, he stated that the tendency toward "merging" had acquired full scope, particularly in the economic sphere.[24]

More moderate voices were heard as well. A *Pravda* article by Bagramov, while noting that

*Union-republic ministries are subordinate jointly both to the republic and the All-Union Councils of Ministers, republic ministries legally only to the former.

"drawing together" was "increasingly acquiring fundamental significance," berated "certain authors who are in a hurry to throw the national element overboard as something that, from their standpoint, is archaic."[25] In a much more critical article in *Istoriya SSSR*, V.P. Sherstobitov criticized those authors who "exaggerate the process of the economic, social and cultural drawing together," and declared the theory that the "drawing together of the peoples is beginning to play the decisive role" to be "a one-sided interpretation." Concluding with a broadside at "some writers" who "feel that the Soviet federal structure has outlived its usefulness," Sherstobitov informed them that "it is wrong to underestimate the significance of national statehood."[26]

At the fiftieth anniversary celebration itself, Brezhnev steered clear of any talk of "merger" but he clearly regarded "drawing together" as the leading tendency:

> The further drawing together of the nations and peoples of our country represents an objective process. The Party is against speeding it up artificially, there is no need for that; this process is dictated by the entire course of our Soviet life. At the same time, the Party considers inadmissible any attempts to restrain the process of drawing together of the nations, to create hindrances to it under one pretext or another or artificially to consolidate national isolation.

Brezhnev also paid great attention to the theme that a "new historical community of people, the Soviet people," had emerged, and implied the primacy of this community over its constituent parts.

Since the fiftieth anniversary most writers have followed Brezhnev's line of stressing "drawing together" while making no claim of imminent "merger." Bagramov, for example, referred to "the ever closer drawing together of nations," but hastened to observe that the view of those who "displayed the desire to make the merger among nations and the withering away of national differences part of the present" had "nothing in common with a scientific outlook." Vladimir Zevin, deputy director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, wrote that Lenin's prediction that socialism would "tremendously accelerate the coming together of nations" was coming to pass.[27]

In line with the subordination of "flowering" to "coming together" is the excessive praise of the Great Russians, so prominent in speeches in the 1970s. In the mid-60s "mutual help" of all nationalities replaced the "older brother" theme as stock terminology, but this has changed. In a throwback to the Stalinist elevation of the Russians to "mentor" status, official spokesmen have indulged in paeans to the Russians' charity in providing spiritual guidance, economic aid, and cultural enrichment to their presumably inferior "younger brothers." At the Twenty-fourth Congress Brezhnev lauded the Great Russians in terms reminiscent of Stalin's toast to the Russian people at the World War II victory celebration, and regional leaders picked up this theme.

There are even indications that neo-Slavophile ideals may be condoned by some Soviet leaders. Since the 1960s traditional Russian nationalism has evidently attracted large numbers of Russian intellectuals, who have used both *samizdat* publications such as Vladimir Osipov's journal *Veche* and the legitimate press, particularly *Molodaya Gvardiya*, as outlets for their views. Ironically, of Soviet leaders it is Polyansky, a Ukrainian by nationality, who is reputedly most sympathetic to conservative Russian nationalism. In 1970 he is reported to have instructed *Sovyetskaya Rossiya* to publish a favorable review of a novel by one of the more extreme nationalist authors. *Pravda* responded with a hostile review of the same work, and Polyansky's conduct was reportedly criticized at a Politburo meeting.[28] Although no other Soviet leaders of such stature have known connections with Russian patriotic dissent, several reports have suggested the existence of a rightist-nationalist society called *Za Rodinu* ("for the motherland"), existing within the Party and consisting of branches throughout the country.[29]

B. Linguistic and Demographic Trends

One way of measuring the impact of Soviet nationality policy on the Ukraine, and of evaluating Brezhnev's claim of 1972 that the national problem "has been settled completely, finally, and for good" is to survey linguistic and ethnic changes in the composition of the Ukraine's population.

The preservation of a national language is not essential for the persistence of nationalism (witness the case of the Irish without Gaelic, or of Soviet

Jews, most of whom speak Russian), and the spread of the Russian language owes more to the similarity between Russian and Ukrainian, and the relative ease with which a Ukrainian can master Russian, as well as to considerations of expediency, than to changes in national loyalties. However, since Ukrainian dissidents have made the use of Ukrainian a symbol of Ukrainian nationalism, the extent of erosion of the language is one indicator of the extent of Russification.

At least in the major cities of East Ukraine, Russian is replacing Ukrainian in public communication. Party and military activities, business administration and civic affairs are conducted in Russian. Travelers to the Ukraine report that in some East Ukrainian cities Ukrainian is simply not spoken in public, and that people regard its use as a mark of social inferiority. The reaction of one Ukrainian-American historian and tourist, though exaggerated, is not atypical:

> Except for . . . stage performances . . . not once in my eleven days in Ukraine did I hear the native language spoken except when I or other foreigners initiated the conversation. . . . The fact is that I have found more people to converse with in the Ukrainian language in Philadelphia or in New York than in Kiev or Odessa.[30]

The most dramatic triumph for linguistic Russification in recent years has been in the area of education, not surprisingly in view of the concerted efforts in this field. Since the 1958 Soviet school law giving parents the choice of sending their children either to Russian-language schools or to Ukrainian-language schools, matriculation at Russian-language schools has increased substantially. Moreover, while Ukrainian is an elective subject in Russian schools, Russian is required in all Ukrainian schools and much of the instruction is, in fact, conducted in Russian.

In general, the higher the level of education, and the more urban the area, the greater the use of Russian as a medium of instruction. Unofficial reports indicate that in a few Russian strongholds of the East Ukraine, notably Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk, Ukrainian schools have virtually disappeared.[32] As for the universities, a Donetsk University professor who left the Soviet Union in 1973 asserted that at his university "all courses were taught in Russian."[33] Lvov University is reportedly following this eastern trend.[34]

Even assuming that parents who opt for Ukrainian schools are not subjected to official penalties or pressures, it is not difficult to account for the rising enrollment at Russian schools. The primacy of Russian at the universities, its widespread use for university admission exams, and the greater vocational opportunities for a Russian-speaking child all provide incentives. It is simply more convenient to attend a Russian school, and in some cities Ukrainian schools appear to be so few in number that no real choice exists. And yet, the acquiescence of Ukrainians in this matter, so crucial to the fate of the indigenous language, testifies to a growing accept-

Russian Language Use in the Ukraine [31]

Figure 3



ance of the privileged status of Russian as the "high" language, the *lingua franca* of all Soviet peoples, with Ukrainian being relegated to the status of a "low" vernacular. Many city dwellers look down upon the Ukrainian language as a vulgar peasant dialect.[35]

A trend toward publishing less literature in Ukrainian has also become apparent in recent years. Library holdings evidently consist overwhelmingly of Russian-language publications. Russian has also made inroads in other media.

Perhaps more significant than the status of the Ukrainian language in public communications are census figures which indicate which language a citizen of the Ukraine designates as his "native language." The choice between Ukrainian and Russian for census purposes, a designation which must be viewed largely as an affirmation of national allegiance, is probably a more accurate gauge of ethnic identification than is information concerning the actual usage of Ukrainian or Russian.

In 1970 Ukrainians represented the largest share in absolute numbers of non-Russians in the Soviet Union who gave Russian as their mother tongue, and ranked second in percentage. A comparison of the 1959 and 1970 censuses* [36] shows that the Ukrainian share of the population of the Ukraine has declined by two percentage points (from 76.8 percent in 1959 to 74.9 percent in 1970), and the Russian element in the Ukraine has risen in about the same proportion (from 16.9 percent to 19.4 percent). There has also been a small decrease in the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians who claim Ukrainian as their native language (from 93.5 percent to 91.4 percent). Russians and linguistically Russified Ukrainians thus constitute about a quarter of the total population of the Ukrainian SSR. If these trends are projected, Russians and linguistically Russified Ukrainians in the Ukraine would constitute almost a third of the population by 1985 and would grow to almost half of the population within the next fifty years. The birth rate of Ukrainians and Russians is about the same, therefore not significantly affecting this projection. Much will depend on the rate of Russian migration into the Ukraine. In addition, over one-third of the Ukrainians who claim Ukrainian as a native tongue also speak Russian fluently as a second language.

The extent of linguistic Russification becomes clearer when the population of the Ukraine is broken down by age groups, regions, and urban-rural divisions. The use of Russian is more extensive in cities and in the East Ukraine, and is somewhat heavier among young people.

Historically Russians in the Ukraine have clustered in the major cities, and today 30 percent of the Ukraine's urban population is Russian, compared to 6 percent of the rural population. Of urban Ukrainians 18 percent claim Russian as their native tongue, compared to only 1 percent in the countryside; and half of the remainder speak fluent Russian, compared to 25 percent in rural Ukraine.* The urban population is growing rapidly, both in absolute and relative terms, from 46 percent of the population of Ukraine in 1959 to 55 percent in 1970. The traditional division of the Ukraine into "Russian" cities and "Ukrainian" countryside persists. Continued urbanization presumably will result in increased assimilation.

The census shows that the West Ukraine is much less susceptible to Russian influence than the East.

*Census data on ethnic and linguistic affiliation must be used with caution. Border changes since 1939 have reduced the value of the censuses of 1926 and 1939; they have not been used in this study. Overall, the 1959 and 1970 censuses appear to understate the degree of linguistic assimilation. First of all, urban residents must declare their nationality at age 16, after which the nationality is recorded in their passports and other documents. Moreover, a child's nationality as stated in his passport at age 16 must coincide with that of at least one parent. Consequently, a Russified Ukrainian would presumably be reluctant to change his nationality to Russian for census purposes, in contradiction to the information already contained in his legal identification papers. Also, if a person of Ukrainian origin does choose to list his nationality and his native language as Russian, the census does not record his Ukrainian ancestry. In other words the census will record a Russified Ukrainian as a Ukrainian if he feels constrained to continue registering his nationality as Ukrainian, and as a Russian if he indicates his complete assimilation. On the other hand, the census may also record Ukrainian as the language of some Russified Ukrainians, since census-takers ask for a person's "native language," which may be confused with the language of one's nationality, rather than for his "conversational language." [37]

*In fact, the percentages for urban Ukraine are probably too low, since the census definition of "urban" is quite broad.

Not only do Russians make up only 5 percent of the Western population; the Ukrainian population showed a small proportionate increase in the intercensal period, and the percentage of Ukrainians in the area claiming Ukrainian as their native tongue rose slightly (from 99 percent to *over* 99 percent).

Subtracting the population of the more "Ukrainian" Western provinces, we find that the remaining population in the Ukraine contains a larger Russian component (22 percent of the population of East Ukraine). Further, the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians who claim Ukrainian as the native tongue also drops slightly in East Ukraine (to 89.3 percent), while roughly 60 percent of the remaining ethnic Ukrainians in East Ukraine speak Russian fluently.

Perhaps more portentous for the future is the tendency of young people to speak Russian more widely than their parents. In 1970 as many as 94 percent of ethnic Ukrainians over age 50 in the Ukraine spoke Ukrainian as their native language, compared to 90 percent of those under age 40. Yet this is a relatively small decrease compared to that of some nationalities.

If the three areas of heaviest assimilation—youth, urban areas, and eastern oblasts—are considered together, the degree of linguistic Russification appears significant, especially over the long haul. In 1970, 22 percent of ethnic Ukrainians residing in urban areas of the East Ukraine recorded Russian as their native language; for young people the percentage was doubtless higher.* In addition, the Russian presence in the urban areas of East Ukraine is greater than in other areas of the union republic. Ethnic Russians constitute 32 percent of the urban population of the East Ukraine. In the urban areas of the East Ukraine, then, the number of linguistically Russified Ukrainians and ethnic Russians combined roughly equals the number of unassimilated Ukrainians there.

Assimilation of Ukrainians cannot entirely account for the increase in the numbers of "Russians" in the Ukraine. The Russian population of the RSFSR increased by 13 percent between 1959 and 1970; the Russian population of the Ukraine increased by more than twice that percentage. Part of the increase is a result of Russian migration into the Ukraine. The fact of Russian migration is not in doubt, but its dimensions cannot be precisely ascertained, since statistics on migration are generally compiled by union republics rather than by nationalities.

According to the census, between 1968 and 1970 over 420,000 people moved from the RSFSR to the Ukraine, and 430,000 from the Ukraine to the RSFSR. Almost half of the RSFSR migrants settled in the heavily Russified Donetsk-Dnepropetrovsk area. Almost certainly, the majority of these migrants from the RSFSR were Russian. Statistics available for the city of Kiev, for example, indicate that 64 percent of those moving to Kiev from the RSFSR were Russian, while 70 percent of those moving from Kiev to the RSFSR were Ukrainian. According to one Soviet statistician, one million Russians moved into the Ukraine during the intercensal period. At the same time, a Ukrainian demographer attested to "an annual planned voluntary resettlement of families and individuals from the densely populated Ukrainian regions to other regions" of the USSR. According to one unofficial report over two million Ukrainians were resettled in this way during 1967 and 1968, but this figure may be high. Although most of the movement out of the Ukraine is probably due more to socioeconomic factors than to nationality policy, it has the effect of increasing the Russian presence in the Ukraine.* [38]

Another index of assimilation is the degree of intermarriage between Russians and Ukrainians within the Ukraine. One Soviet publication indicates that over one-fourth of all marriages in Ukrainian cities are mixed—a higher percentage than in any republic except for Latvia. According to other Soviet publications, 18.5 percent of Ukrainian families in urban areas, and 4 percent in rural areas, are mixed, and the number of mixed marriages in the

*The statistics for age groups are given only for the Ukraine as a whole.

*It should be noted that a larger percentage of ethnic Ukrainians lived in the Ukraine in 1970 than in 1959, and Ukrainians form a smaller percentage of the population of other republics than previously. This suggests that Ukrainians are becoming less dispersed, more concentrated. Assimilation of Ukrainians living outside the Ukraine may account for this impression.

Ukraine has quadrupled in less than 50 years.[39] What scant published data concerning housing patterns exist do not indicate that Ukrainians and Russians in Ukrainian cities live in segregated ethnic *barrios*.[40]

C. Modernization and Russification

To the extent that Russification of the Ukrainian population has taken place, this process probably owes more to long-range forces of social mobilization than to the more direct efforts of Soviet authorities to combat nationalism. Urbanization, industrialization, and standardized education are centripetal forces in the Soviet Union, as elsewhere. They tend to foster increased mobility and contacts between different nationalities, and the adoption of uniform cultural, economic, and political forms. In an era of improved communications, the use of Russian as a modern-day Latin, though not its adoption as a native language, is dictated by practical necessity. And the resident of Kiev, be he Russian or Ukrainian, has more in common with other urban dwellers regardless of nationality than he does with the collective farm peasant.

The impact of modernization, however, cuts both ways. The integration demanded by modern conditions may in turn stimulate a yearning for a return to a more distinctive, independent, and narrow community. Just as familiarity may breed contempt, nationalism can become more potent when two nationalities live in close proximity, each regarding the other as a threat. Thus, while urbanization may ultimately undercut Ukrainian nationalism by eliminating national differences, it may have a more immediate effect of aggravating ethnic conflict by sharpening awareness of those differences. The typical Ukrainian dissident is an urban intellectual of peasant stock, the person best placed to observe the *kulturkampf*. The protests of Ukrainian nationalists in the cities are in part provoked by the very success of Russification, by the gradual assimilation of Ukrainians, the demeaning of the indigenous culture, and the competition for jobs between Russians and Ukrainians. It is no accident that the major cities of the Ukraine, the spearheads of Russian penetration, are also centers of Ukrainian nationalism.

Like urbanization, mass education has strengthened Ukrainian nationalism by stirring into action classes which formerly played a passive part in political life; and by augmenting the size of the intellectual elite, the only group capable of espousing nationalism as a coherent ideology and providing leadership for a nationalist movement. Thus far, nationalist dissent has remained largely confined to the "humanistic" or "literary" intelligentsia, and continued ascendancy of the scientific-technical intelligentsia may spell more rapid Russification. The existence of the union republic government, however, has provided administrative experience for a native elite, and the economic modernization of the Ukraine since 1917 has given it a diversified social structure with the potential for self-rule and self-sufficiency.

IV. NATIONALIST DISSENT IN THE UKRAINE

Twice in this century nationalist Ukrainians have taken advantage of Russia's involvement in a world war to try to break away from Russian domination. Each time it was their misfortune that circumstances led them, however reluctantly, to turn to the German state for succor. In 1917, after the Bolshevik revolution, a short-lived independent government, the Rada, was set up in the Ukraine, but this university-inspired, German-backed independence movement failed to win widespread popular support.

In 1941 many Ukrainians welcomed the German invasion, believing that even Nazi rule would be less oppressive than that of Stalin, and hopeful that Hitler would ultimately permit the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. Although some Ukrainians continued to collaborate with the Nazis until the end, the brutality of the Nazi occupation disillusioned the great bulk of the population, many of whom came to adopt a plague-on-both-your-houses approach. Probably a majority of those in the West Ukrainian area would have preferred the establishment of a sovereign Ukrainian government to either the Russian or the German occupation. The organized Ukrainian resistance, which included both the open military-like formations of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and secret members of the Ukrainian underground or Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), reached an estimated peak strength of 20,000. In addition, partisan bands of

guerrillas formed in the countryside to fight both Russians and Germans. After the war armed resistance continued on a small scale until 1950 or later.

Ukrainian nationalism today is far removed from that of World War II. No organized national group commanding a mass following has existed since the routing of the UPA and OUN. During the late 1950s and early 1960s a number of secessionist groups appeared briefly in West Ukraine,* but they seem to have represented the dying gasp of the wartime resistance rather than a new nationalist movement. Although these tiny bands of militants drew up programs, they did virtually nothing in the way of concrete action to implement their objectives before being rounded up, tried, and sent to labor camps.

In the late 1960s dissent seems to have taken on a new character. Dissidents since then have been less organized and more fragmented, less conspiratorial and more open, less single-minded in their quest for national sovereignty and more variegated, less militant but perhaps more geographically widespread. Dissent has been manifested in strikes, demonstrations, and petitions, as well as in the less risky outlet of literature and history writing. Most of the protests appear to have taken place largely without planning. Dissident journalist Vyacheslav Chornovil contended that the majority of Ukrainians arrested in 1965, at the time of the Moscow trial of the writers Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel, "were not acquainted with one another and were not in any way associated."[41] Dissidents have, however, collaborated in such enterprises as petition campaigns for the release of political prisoners. Leading dissidents in major Ukrainian cities do maintain some communication, especially between Kiev and Lvov,[42] but to dwell on these fleeting contacts is to create the misleading impression of a conspiratorial network with cells in various locales.

*These included:

(1) The United Party for the Liberation of the Ukraine or OPVU (1958-1959), in Ivano-Frankovsk;

(2) The Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union or URSS (1959-1960), in Lvov;

(3) The Ukrainian National Committee or UNK (1961), in Lvov;

(4) The Ukrainian National Front (1964-1967), in West Ukraine;

(5) The Democratic Union of Socialists (1964), in Odessa.

In addition to the few intellectuals who have cast their lot with open dissent there are large numbers of "establishment" intellectuals who sympathize with nationalist views in varying degrees. Since the limits of the permissible expand and contract in accordance with the changing political situation, the line separating these quasi-dissidents from the open dissidents is hard to draw.

A. Geographical and Sociological Breakdown

West Ukraine, with Lvov in the forefront, makes up the geographic homeland of Ukrainian nationalism. The nationalist movement of World War II was centered in Galicia. All but one of the nationalist organizations in the late 1950s and 1960s were confined to West Ukraine, and many of the dissidents elsewhere in the Ukraine, particularly those in Kiev, are of West Ukrainian origin or have spent some time there. The most recent flare-up of university-centered nationalism also occurred in West Ukraine, where in 1972 and 1973 scores of university students and teachers are reported to have been arrested or subjected to other reprisals in Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, and Ternopol. Over the last twenty years known arrests in West Ukraine for dissident activities or views outnumber those in the much more heavily populated East Ukraine by a ratio of at least three to one.[43] In the 1960s, however, the national "movement" appeared to revive in the East Ukraine, mainly in Kiev and other northern cities, but also in Dnepropetrovsk and other cities in the south. Dissidents in the East Ukraine have generally espoused a less virulent form of nationalism typified by the writings of Ivan Dzyuba, literary critic and author of *Internationalism or Russification?*, than the secessionist variety spawned in West Ukraine.

A sociological breakdown of Ukrainian dissidents reveals, not unexpectedly, a heavy preponderance of writers, linguists, historians, journalists, teachers, and lawyers. Although most of the more visible dissidents belong to this literary or "humanistic" intelligentsia, their dominance is probably not as great as is the case with dissent in Russia. Among Ukrainian dissidents are many members of the scientific-technical intelligentsia, whose opposition is more troublesome for Soviet authorities. Members of the

scientific-technical intelligentsia comprise about a fourth of known arrests during the last twenty years.

Perhaps even more alarming for the regime are signs of nationalism among lower strata of the population. A great fear of the central authorities may be that, at some period of great strain for the government, such as military attack by China or a succession struggle among top Soviet leaders, Ukrainian intellectual dissidents could tap a reservoir of latent mass discontent. The Ukrainian dissidents possess a potential weapon their Russian counterparts do not, since in the Ukraine the normal economic grievances of the population may be aggravated by popular resentment of Russian domination.

It is difficult to know whether the peasantry would rally to a future Ukrainian nationalist movement in time of crisis in Moscow. The peasants in 1917-1920 were not willing to fight for the Ukrainian Rada, but this may have been because the new government did not enact a progressive land reform. During the 1930s ethnic conflict between Ukrainians and Russians was at times reinforced by class conflict. The peasantry of East Ukraine suffered greatly during collectivization, and many Ukrainians felt, rightly or wrongly, that collectivization was directed against them as a nationality as much as against a particular class. During World War II the peasants of West Ukraine gave their support to the activities of separatist groups there. In East Ukraine, however, although the Ukrainian underground attracted large numbers of the intellectual elite, they were leaders in search of an army. The peasants remained uncommitted, although many leaders were sons of purged *kulaks*. The strength of active Ukrainian nationalism today appears to lie in the cities.

Workers comprise about a fourth of those arrested for nationalist activities in the last two decades, this significant a proportion mainly because they played an important role in the more militant nationalist organizations of the 1950s and early 1960s. More recently, a few reports have surfaced of mass protests even in Eastern Ukrainian cities, involving workers and others outside the narrow confines of the intelligentsia.[44] The largest such incident, a two-day riot with a nationalist complexion, took place in Dneprodzerzhinsk in June 1972. A few months later in the same oblast, in Dnepropetrovsk, a major strike is reported to have broken out. On both occasions the police resorted to gunfire to disperse crowds of demonstrators.[45] Aside from these presumably spontaneous revolts, on a few occasions workers have engaged in organized protests with political as well as economic objectives.*

There are also a few instances of members of the intelligentsia acting in conjunction with the workers, thus breaking through class barriers to achieve the elusive "union with the people" ever sought by the estranged intelligentsia in pre-revolutionary days. Some of these occasions have been relatively innocuous affairs, involving such things as public readings of Ukrainian poetry. Others have been more serious, particularly the annual commemoration of the transfer of the body of Taras Shevchenko, the Ukraine's great nineteenth century poet, from Russia to the Ukraine. These demonstrations have taken place in Kiev since 1964, and involve hundreds of people. With the exception of an April 1968 petition of 139 Ukrainians, which contained the signatures of 26 workers, workers have not participated in petition campaigns protesting arrests and trials of dissidents. Generally speaking, nationalism as a conscious ideology is confined to the intelligentsia.

B. Grievances of the Disaffected

Intellectual dissidents in the Ukraine do not divide neatly into distinct groups, but there are two basic currents of the "movement." One current, best represented until his recantation in 1973 by Ivan Dzyuba, comprises a new generation of nationalists, who are not anti-Soviet but merely anti-Russian or, as dissident philologist Mykhaylo Horyn put it, "not anti-Soviet, but pro-Ukrainian." Some of the Ukrainians of this stripe, such as

*In May 1969, for example, a protest originally directed at housing conditions soon took on a political coloring, when an unofficial workers' council organized in Kiev circulated a petition decrying living conditions, then met to elect a former army major to present the petition in person to authorities in Moscow. The workers reportedly marched from their meeting with banners demanding "all power to the soviets," a revolutionary catch phrase calling for a workers' democracy.[46]

Ivan Dzyuba, dissident author of *Internationalism or Russification?*

lawyer Lev Lukyanenko and journalist Mykhaylo Osadchy, are former Communist Party members, and most of them have a Marxist orientation. As a rule, they embrace Communism, not as embodied in the current regime, but in an ideal form which they associate, correctly or incorrectly, with Lenin. Thus, a group of Dnepropetrovsk petitioners in 1969 protested the persecution of "honest Ukrainians devoted to the cause of the construction of Communism,"[47] and Chornovil wrote from labor camp that "I have always firmly adhered to the principles of socialism and continue to do so." In January 1970 the opening issue of the *Ukrainian Herald*, the Ukrainian counterpart of the Russian *samizdat** Journal *Khronika*, announced its policy of not printing any documents it deemed "anti-Communist" or "anti-Soviet" (defined in its original sense as "opposition to democratically-elected councils, soviets, in government").[48]

Like the wing of Russian dissent represented by Roy Medvedev, these Ukrainian dissidents attempt to use Lenin against the regime, to criticize the authorities for failing to follow their own prophets. Also like Medvedev, many of them claim to believe that the present system is redeemable and can reform itself from within. For this reason, their criticisms may be more insidious and effective; certainly they make the authorities' time-honored propaganda line against nationalism look dated. To the authorities contention that nationalists are, by definition, "lackeys of the international bourgeoisie," the dissidents counter that those who are being tried as "bourgeois nationalists" today are not survivals from the bourgeois past but "young people who grew up under the Soviet regime, were educated in Soviet schools, Soviet universities and in the Komsomol . . . people who do not remember the bourgeois system."[49]

While defending the abstract right of the Ukraine to secede from the Soviet Union, these dissidents make clear that they do not advocate the exercise of this right. Most of the dissidents were born in the 1930s, too late to be involved in the violent nationalism of World War II days. Dissociating themselves from the OUN, they keep their protest within legal boundaries and purportedly aim merely at the restoration of the Ukraine's legal rights under the Soviet constitution. Trying to legitimize his dissent, Dzyuba insisted that "nobody in the Ukraine advances the slogan of 'independence' today."[50]

As is often the case with Soviet dissidents who criticize flaws in their own system from a socialist standpoint, many Ukrainians claim to abhor the efforts of Westerners to utilize their criticisms for "Cold War" purposes. Literary critic Yevhen Sverstyuk, regretting that his name was "shrewdly picked up by bourgeois propaganda in the West," explained his quandary at his trial:

> I find myself between two fires, and instead of working at full capacity in the sphere of the spiritual development of our society, I helplessly became the victim of the gambling game of ideological struggle.[51]

Such protestations are of dubious sincerity, but certainly the tendency in recent years has been for

*The Russian term—translatable literally as "self-published," i.e., without official sanction—is synonomous with dissident literature. The Ukrainian term is *samvydav*.

Ukrainian dissidents to lay stress on the limited and patriotic nature of their aims.

Because of the bad connotations of the word "nationalists," many dissidents have tried to turn the tables by arguing that it is not they, but the Russians, who are nationalists. They protest that they are no more nationalistic than was Lenin, who at times advocated national equality as the only basis for true internationalism, and blamed Russian chauvinism for stimulating minority nationalism. "If there is no chauvinism," dissident literature teacher Mykhaylo Masyutko stated, "there is no nationalism."[52] Chornovil, loath to accept the nationalist label, argued at his trial that one need not be a nationalist to protest illegality:

> I did not dwell on the nationalities question in my statements. The conclusion (that I am a nationalist) has been drawn solely on the basis of the fact that I wrote about violations of legality committed in the Ukraine. And if I lived in Tambov and wrote something similar, what kind of nationalist would I be then—a Tambovian one?[53]

In a similar vein, Dzyuba maintained that he had no quarrel with sincere internationalism, but condemned the "internationalism" which serves as a cover for Russification and exploitation:

> Their "internationalism" is the "internationalism" of the robber who has seized choice morsels and does not want to hand them back. Instead, he appeals to the conscience of the victim: what a shame and what backwardness to separate "mine" and "thine," how ignoble, how unfraternal. . . . True love for another people or peoples means that we want that people to be itself and not similar to us; we want to see it independent and equal outside and beside ourselves, not as a part of ourselves.[54]

Dzyuba and those of his persuasion, matching ideological with tactical moderation, have been inclined to concentrate their activity in literary and scholarly fields, generally refraining from overt actions to provoke the authorities.[55]

A more traditional current of nationalism, long concentrated in the West Ukraine, tends toward more radical and explicitly political actions directed toward the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. Today a somewhat toned-down version of this trend of nationalist thought can be found in the writings of historian Valentyn Moroz.[56] Not professing to be Marxist, Moroz comes close to a condemnation of the Soviet system in toto. He discusses the alleged campaign to obliterate Ukrainian identity in terms of the state compulsion allegedly pervading all areas of Soviet life, and stifling all stirrings of individuality and nonconformity. Moroz recognizes the value of pragmatic dissidents who "make idiotic official speeches" in order to aid the cause by retaining their positions and "boring from within," but he believes the leaders of the dissidents should take a higher road. When Dzyuba partially recanted his nationalist views in 1969 in order to avoid official persecution, Moroz chastised him for acting like a capitulator.[57] Moroz's long and nearly suicidal prison hunger strike indicates the lengths to which he himself would go before making a compromising statement.

Valentyn Moroz, the Ukraine's most celebrated political prisoner

Even those dissidents who have openly favored the establishment of a sovereign Ukrainian state have not sanctioned the use of violence. Those tried in the so-called "case of the jurists" in 1961 confessed to secessionist agitation but stated that forcible methods were neither used nor contemplated.

During the sixties the more moderate Marxist nationalism appeared to be in the ascendancy. The repressions of the Brezhnev period, however, may have brought about a return to the more traditional and radical variety. Recent leaflets reportedly circulating in the Ukraine in protest of Moroz's imprisonment call for an independent Ukraine which "may well remain socialist," but "must not remain Soviet, for that is merely a synonym for absorption into Russia." The dissidents circulating these leaflets reportedly stated their intention of forming "an action-oriented group, a real organization." At the same time, the *Ukrainian Herald,* suppressed for over two years, has reappeared under new and more aggressive editors who have issued a call for a "struggle for national liberation."* [58]

Their ideological and tactical differences have not prevented Ukrainian nationalists from cooperating with each other, in much the same manner that Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn minimized their differences in the face of a common enemy. In 1970 Dzyuba appeared at Moroz's trial to testify in his behalf, shortly after Moroz had subjected Dzyuba's overly "realistic" approach to scathing criticism. Nor do the dissidents as a rule appear to shun contacts with former UPA members, many of whom were released from labor camps in the 1960s. According to one report, "the general attitude of the dissidents is to 'embrace' these people in their midst." Ivan Svitlichny is known to have befriended one such former leader, and Dzyuba reportedly planned to assist the education of another's son. Only one prominent dissident, renowned literary critic and translator Svyatoslav Karavansky, was active in the World War II armed resistance; his former activities have not prevented Chornovil and others from coming to his defense, even while they are careful to point out that they do not excuse his past.[59]

While the dissidents disagree on tactics and on long-range objectives, a number of grievances are voiced regularly by dissidents of both camps. Aside from the controversial issue of political independence for the Ukraine, the most common grievances, in order of the attention given them by petitions and *samizdat* writings are:

(1) Policies promoting the linguistic Russification of the Ukraine. These draw the heaviest criticism, seemingly out of proportion to the objective importance of the issue. A high proportion of dissidents are philologists and students of Ukrainian literature, who have made the use of the native language a badge of Ukrainian identity. Since a national state which could be glorified as the carrier of the Ukrainian ethos does not exist, Ukrainian nationalists look to their language to perform this function.

(2) Cultural and political oppression not directly related to purely Ukrainian matters: illegal judicial proceedings (this because many of the petitions are protesting arrests and trials), the general lack of civil liberties, the standardization and uniformity allegedly imposed on all areas of Soviet life, the pervasiveness of "Stalinist" modes of behavior in the bureaucracy, the vacuity of intellectual life. Moroz writes derisively of the "empire of cogs," Chornovil of "woe from wit," borrowing the title of a nineteenth-century Russian novel ridiculing the repression of critical or independent thought, and Sversytuk of the "sensuous, physiological materialism" which makes the "routine fulfillment of the monthly and annual production plans" the end-all of human existence, and of the dulling of the intellect by "the soothing talk about soccer, ballet, and outer space." [60]

(3) The lack of minority rights, especially the lack of Ukrainian-language schools, for the millions of Ukrainians living outside the Ukrainian SSR.

(4) The transfer of Ukrainians, especially those with scientific knowledge or technical skills, to Siberia, Kazakhstan and other parts of the USSR, and the settlement of Russians in the Ukraine. Related to this grievance is the complaint that Ukrainians are under-represented in various occupational elites within their own union republic.

(5) Repression of Ukrainian culture. This includes physical acts of destruction, such as the

*There is some question as to the authenticity of the new issues of the *Ukrainian Herald*. Some observers think it unlikely that bona fide dissidents would admit openly that they planned to form a separatist organization, thus inviting KGB attention, even if such was their intention.

tearing down of Ukrainian historical monuments, and the "accidental" burning of old churches and libraries, rich in historical documents, as well as the distortion of Ukrainian history in scholarly works, and the ban on publication of the works of many Ukrainian nineteenth-century historians.

(6) Economic exploitation of the Ukraine by the RSFSR, and excessive centralization of economic decision-making.

(7) Poor living conditions and wages for workers and peasants. While economic grievances are central in the most recent strikes and disorders among workers, they receive scant attention in the writings of the intelligentsia. Several dissidents have called for an end to passport regulations which restrict the movement of collective farm peasants. Vasyl Lutskiv, a former Party member connected with a small dissident group, the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union, criticized the oppression of the peasants, "whose position did not differ at all from the position of the serfs," dissident Anton Koval in 1969 called for increased wages and consumer goods for the lower-paid, and Horyn looked forward to the day when the economic fate of the peasants would be "in the hands of the collective farm peasants themselves." [61] Such demands are surprisingly few, despite the lower class origin of the bulk of the intellectual dissidents and must make their brand of nationalism less attractive to the masses.

(8) The lack of a Ukrainian national militia.

Implicit in all these demands are two more general desires: the desire for greater individual freedom, and the desire for a greater decentralization of authority in all spheres—political, economic, and cultural.

C. "Establishment" Intelligentsia and Nationalism

The importance of these desires of the dissidents is enhanced by the fact that large numbers of "establishment" intellectuals in the Ukraine share them, in greater or lesser degree, and offer the active dissidents as much support as they consider possible without endangering their own careers. The most notable group of these liberal intellectuals are the so-called *shestydesyatnyky* or men of the sixties, a group of Western-oriented, humanistic, and sometimes nationalist poets who were instrumental in bringing about an "awakening" of Ukrainian culture in the sixties. Included in this group were some, such as Dzyuba and Svitlychny, who eventually went beyond the pale in their criticisms of the regime to become outright dissidents. The greatest of them, Vasyl Symonenko, achieved such popularity that after his early death in 1963 authorities chose not to anathematize his work, but tried instead to neutralize its effect by playing down its nationalist content. Today Ivan Drach is perhaps the best example of those in the group who, like Yevtushenko in Russia, temper their criticism and choose "safe" themes in order to keep out of trouble. Many others have avoided arrest but have been subjected to other reprisals and have had difficulty getting their works published.

Although the *shestydesyatnyky* were attacked in the press from 1962 on, their influence remained strong among Ukrainian intellectuals. Some from this group were arrested in 1965, but at the November 1966 Ukrainian Writers' Congress their supporters dominated the proceedings, making open pleas for a revitalization of Ukrainian cultural life, a restoration of national dignity, and a rehabilitation of the Ukrainian language, affirming that "while we are internationalists, we always remain Ukrainians." [62]

New nationalist trends also appeared in the 1960s in another medium, the writing of history. A few historians, among them Fedor Shevchenko, longtime editor of the *Ukrainian Historical Journal*, dared to emphasize the unique features of Ukraine's past, and argued that Communist culture need not be "boring, despondently uniform, lacking historical, ethnographical and other varieties and peculiarities." [63] Brought into question were sanctified canons of Soviet historiography, such as the "friendship of peoples" theory, according to which the Cossack hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky's 1654 treaty with the Russian state is seen as having effected a voluntary union of the Ukraine and Russia, and the nationalist poet Taras Shevchenko is portrayed as an admiring "younger brother" of Russian radicals like Nikolay Chernyshevsky.

Oles Honchar, Chairman of the Ukrainian Writers' Union Under Shelest

Of the rash of monographs and novels challenging the orthodox Soviet interpretation of the medieval Kievan period and the later Cossack period, several were written by well-established writers. *Death in Kiev* by Pavlo Zahrebelny, a member of the Ukrainian Writers' Union board, portrayed the life of a medieval Kievan prince in a favorable way. A novel by Oles Honchar, Chairman of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, became the target of a major ideological campaign in 1968. The novel, *Sobor* or *Cathedral*, bewailed the fate of an old cathedral slated for destruction in the name of "progress" by a Party official. The cathedral was clearly symbolic of rural and traditional values, and reviewers identified the setting, a metallurgical town on the Dnepr, as Dnepropetrovsk, a center of Russification in the Ukraine.[64] In the subsequent fall-out, a number of Honchar's supporters were expelled from the Party or dismissed from their jobs, but Honchar himself commanded enough support in the Writers' Union and in the Party to retain the chairmanship until the Congress of May 1971, at which he continued to express regret that many readers were losing contact with the Ukrainian language, "that beautiful, fragrant language whose beauty and wealth evokes the admiration of the Russian and all other fraternal peoples."[65] The annulment of his re-election reportedly evoked an outcry from the assembled writers.

Even after the Honchar case, works with a similar message continued to be published, sometimes by people with important official positions. In 1972 Nikolay Kitsenko, a former ideology secretary in Zaporozhe oblast, published a history of the Zaporozhian Cossacks which allegedly glamorized Cossack leaders who fought the Russians, and even used the term "foreign rabble" to refer to the latter. In 1973 Ivan Bilik wrote a novel in which he stressed the antiquity and Western roots of the culture and ethnic make-up of the medieval Ukrainian state of Kiev Rus, and a biography of a Cossack hetman written by Volodymyr Zaremba, a young writer from Dnepropetrovsk, allegedly embellished Ukrainian history in a like manner.[66]

Another instance of ferment among "establishment" intellectuals was the case of Vitaly Shelest.[67] Son of Party Secretary Petr Shelest, and deputy director of the Institute of Theoretical Physics in Kiev, in 1970 he initiated a discussion on the state of scientific research in the Soviet Union. Evidently enjoying widespread backing in the scientific community, he advocated increased funding for basic research and exchange programs designed to promote contact with Western scientists. Vitaly Shelest's proposals were criticized in the Ukrainian press, and he stopped publicly propagating his views by 1971. With his father's ouster, he lost his position.

D. Contacts with Eastern Europe and the West

Ukrainian dissidents have several other sources of potential support. Learning a lesson from the Jews, in recent years they have increased their

efforts to bring external pressure to bear on Soviet authorities. In the course of the recent campaign to obtain the release of Moroz from prison, for example, several appeals were made to international organizations. Ukrainian dissidents command nothing like the widespread attention in the West enjoyed by Soviet Jews, but the government of Canada, which has a large and influential Ukrainian population, has interceded on occasion on behalf of beleaguered Ukrainian intellectuals. John Kolasky, a Canadian Communist of Ukrainian extraction who lived in the Ukraine from 1963 to 1965 wrote an exposé of conditions there which prompted the Canadian Communist Party to send an official delegation to the Ukraine in 1967 to examine Kolasky's allegations. The delegation published a damning report of its own the following year.[68]

More important are the nearby populations of Eastern Europe, always sympathetic to minority strivings against Russian hegemony. It was the sense of common subjection to the Russian yoke that impelled Karavansky to address a 1965 appeal to Gomulka,[69] informing him of the persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals, and urging fraternal cooperation between the Ukraine and East European countries. The Ukraine has maintained close cultural relations with Poland and more especially with Czechoslovakia. The fact that many West Ukrainians speak Polish or at least understand it facilitates communication. The Polish strikes of 1970 are reported to have been widely discussed by workers in Lvov.

The Ukrainian population of Czechoslovakia is concentrated in the Presov region of East Slovakia. The presence of a nearby group of Ukrainians with relatively more cultural freedom has made Soviet authorities uneasy, as can be seen by the fact that authorities have forbidden Soviet Ukrainians from subscribing to Ukrainian publications from Poland or Czechoslovakia, although Czech or Slovak literature has been permitted. This prohibition proved an ineffective barrier to communications between the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia. Ukrainian broadcasts from Radio Presov were beamed into the Soviet Union even before 1968, and Presov Ukrainian journals and newspapers were routinely smuggled across the border. Shelest's son is reported to have regularly received *Duklya*, one such publication. The Presov publications provided an outlet for Soviet Ukrainian writers to publish articles which they could not print in the Ukraine. Some Ukrainian intellectuals, notably Rostislav Bratun, editor of *Zhovten*, the organ of the Lvov Writers' Union, had long advocated closer ties with Ukrainian writers in Slovakia. Bratun seems to have had backing from Oles Honchar. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia the editorial board of *Zhovten* came under attack.[70]

During the Dubcek liberalization in the spring and summer of 1968, when Ukrainians within Czechoslovakia were striving to achieve increased autonomy, Ukrainian officials evidenced increased nervousness about ideological deviations.[71] In late June 1968 "Ukrainian Days" were held in Slovakia. The Ukrainian Party could hardly avoid sending a delegation, which the Slovaks are reported to have received almost as if they were emissaries from an independent state. The Soviet press generally toned down Czechoslovak statements about the celebration, but an article in *Literaturna Ukraina*, entitled "Friendship and Brotherhood Should Become Stronger," quoted from Czechoslovak press releases covering the visit of the Ukrainians.[72] Following this a *Pravda* article in July, written by Aleksandr Botvin, first secretary of Kiev city Party committee (gorkom), denounced "decadent petty theories . . . about the necessity for a 'democratization' and 'liberalization' of socialism," stated that "the efforts of some writers and artists to defend exposed anti-Soviets" had been "angrily condemned," and noted that measures had been taken in Kiev to "screen" and "segregate" the cadre.[73] During this period the campaign against Honchar's *Sobor* was taking place in Dnepropetrovsk, and Botvin's article also took a shot at Honchar.

Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest was an ardent Politburo advocate of invasion of Czechoslovakia. He played a leading role in the negotiations prior to the invasion; he was the only Soviet except for Brezhnev who attended all five of the key Soviet-East European meetings in the spring and summer of 1968. [redacted] indicates that Shelest led the hardline faction within the Politburo; reportedly the fear that the Czech disease might infect Soviet Ukraine was a factor

in his thinking.[74] According to Czech leader Smrkovsky, Shelest was particularly upset with Czech leaders for allowing literature urging the return of Transcarpathia to Czechoslovakia to cross the border into the Ukraine.[75] Many reports also indicate that other members of the old "Ukrainian clique" on the Politburo—Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kirilenko, and Polyansky—also came down on the side of invasion. Their familiarity with Ukrainian conditions and fear of a domino-effect may have made them more aggressive.

Speakers at the July 1968 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee included not only Shelest, but two other Ukrainian Party officials—Vladimir Degtyarev, First Secretary of Donetsk obkom, and Yury Ilnitsky, First Secretary of Transcarpathia obkom. Ilnitsky was not even a member of the CPSU Central Committee; his position as party boss of a small, relatively unimportant oblast would not normally have entitled him to any significant role in the deliberations. Presumably he was included as an official from the region where repercussions from the Czech liberalization were being felt most keenly, to bolster the case for invasion. Ilnitsky soon emerged as a major advocate of "vigilance." He wrote articles in 1968 and 1969 attacking the nostalgia of "somebody in the West" over "the pseudo-democracy of both Masaryk and Benes," and noting that "under the conditions of our border oblast . . . it is especially important for us to propagate ideas of proletarian internationalism" since "this oblast is vulnerable to foreign radio and TV."[76]

When the invasion came, one report indicated that a Soviet military truck was fired on before crossing the Ukrainian border into Czechoslovakia. One of the first acts of the entering Soviet army was reportedly the closing of the Presov radio station.[77] Very few prominent Ukrainian intellectuals could be enticed to endorse the invasion publicly.

E. Relations with Russian, Jewish, and Christian Dissent

In the past Russian and Ukrainian dissidents have not succeeded very well in orchestrating their criticisms of the regime. Cooperation between the two groups has been impeded by the traditional refusal of Russian liberals to take Ukrainian nationalism seriously. Russian dissidents, many of them loath to regard the Ukrainians as a separate nationality, have typically shown reluctance to sanction the Ukrainians' right to self-determination, arguing instead that the general alleviation of government repression would eliminate the *raison d'etre* of Ukrainian nationalism. Ukrainian nationalists, for their part, have often defined their crusade for Ukrainian rights narrowly, taking little interest in the all-union struggle for civil liberties. In recent years attitudes on both sides have changed somewhat, but some distrust remains.

One major wing of Russian dissent, that with a "Slavophile" orientation, tends to exclude the Ukraine from any right to secede from the Soviet Union. Vladimir Osipov, for example, has said that the non-Russian parts of the USSR should be given up, but indicated that these did not include the Ukraine.[78] *Slovo Natsii*, a *samizdat* manifesto of the extreme Russian Right, complained of "a truly disproportional strengthening of the mightiest of the regional groupings, the Ukrainians," at the expense of the Russians, and called for the annexation of large portions of East Ukraine by the RSFSR.[79] Although Solzhenitsyn has defended the Ukrainians on occasion, his reported lack of enthusiasm about Ukrainian separatism has been exploited by the Ukrainian press. In May 1974 *Literaturna Ukraina* distorted his views by exulting that Solzhenitsyn, a man "glorified" by Ukrainian nationalists, turned out to be "an autocrat who regards 'Little Russian ravings' about self-determination from the same positions as Katkov and Valuyev."* [80]

Igor Shafarevich, a dissident mathematician close to Solzhenitsyn, resents the tendency of some Ukrainian dissidents to reduce the national problem to a single formula of "colonial exploitation" by the Russians. According to Shafarevich:

> The basic features of national life in the USSR are inevitable products of the reigning socialist ideology. This ideology is hostile to every nation, just as it is inimical to every individual human personality. In the interests of its relentless advance it can temporarily exploit one or another people, but its fundamental tendency is the maximum destruction of all nations. In no way do the Russians suffer from this less than other peoples; in fact it was they who received the first blow from this force.

*Nineteenth-century Russian nationalists.

Shafarevich maintains that in dealing with the nationalities question it is essential to go beyond the assumption "that the creation of a sovereign state for each people would provide an automatic solution to all that people's problems."[81]

The currents of thought grouped together for the sake of convenience under the "Slavophile" or "Russian nationalist" label are actually quite diverse, however. The emphasis some "Slavophiles" place on traditional and rural values could conceivably make them sympathetic to those Ukrainian dissidents who define *their* national identity in similar terms.

Most other Russian dissident groups, when pressed, recognize the Ukrainians' right to national self-determination, even if only as an abstract principle. Roy Medvedev, for example, advocates a constitutional reform setting up a practical mechanism by which a republic could have a referendum and exercise its formal right to secede from the Soviet Union. "Our Union," he insists, "must be a completely voluntary union of nations." At the same time, he asserts that he "would resolutely oppose the departure of any of the republics from the USSR," mainly on economic grounds.[82]

The Ukrainians complain that few Russian dissidents have any real desire to see concessions made to the nationalists. The *Ukrainian Herald,* "without denying the importance of *Khronika*" (the major organ of Soviet dissent in the late 1960s), complained of a general neglect of the plight of the minorities:

> *Khronika* . . . has rather unilaterally and pretentiously assumed the stance of a supranational or all-union journal, when in fact it is the product of Russian (and possibly, in part, Jewish) circles. . . . The sparse informational reports from the republics are worked in as though they were supplementary to the quite extensive description of events in Russia, mostly in Moscow.

Writing about Russian civil rights' groups, the *Ukrainian Herald* lamented that:

> None of these organizations had worked out a program for solving the national question in the USSR and none had stated its position on national demands. . . . The impression obtained is that the participants in these groups, while aiming at very radical changes in many spheres of social life, wished—to one degree or another—to preserve the status quo on the national question.[83]

In addition, relations between Ukrainian and Russian dissidents were reportedly strained by the 1973 trial of Russian dissident Petr Yakir. Yakir, who talked rather freely during his interrogation, reportedly gave the KGB information about his contacts with Ukrainians, which helped the authorities build a case against Chornovil.[84]

In general, however, dissidents of all stripes have tended to close ranks and act in concert in recent years. The Ukrainians have some contacts with dissidents in Moscow, particularly with Sakharov, who is a friend of Ivan Svitlichny, a Ukrainian literary critic and leading dissident. Sakharov's Human Rights Committee has issued several appeals on behalf of beleaguered Ukrainian dissidents, most recently in defense of Moroz. Svitlichny and another Ukrainian attended the trial of Russian dissident Pavel Litvinov in 1968, and on at least one occasion Sakharov, at the request of Svitlichny travelled to Kiev to attend the trial of a Ukrainian nationalist.[85]

The major concern of the dissidents in Moscow has been to draw Ukrainian nationalists into the broader human rights movement. For example, the Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union, signed in 1969 by anonymous "Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine, and the Baltics," while endorsing "national liberation of minorities," stressed that this "should be linked in the closest way to the common democratic struggle."[86] A number of Ukrainians have addressed themselves almost entirely to the broader movement for human rights, and are not closely associated with Ukrainian matters as such. These include mathematician Leonid Plyushch and retired General Grigorenko; writer Yuly Daniel is half Ukrainian. Those chiefly concerned with Ukrainian interests have paid increased attention to violations of legality elsewhere. The April 1968 Appeal of 139 Ukrainians[87] protested the trial of Russian writer Aleksandr Ginsburg, as well as the more general "suppression of civic activity and social criticism." The signatories included people like Svitlichny and Sverstyuk associated primarily with the specifically Ukrainian interest, as well as others with records of involvement in the broader struggle for civil rights. The Ukrainians have also stressed the community of interest between themselves and other minority

nationalities. Grigorenko has made the defense of the Crimean Tatars a *cause celebre,* and Karavansky's 1966 Petition to the Soviet of Nationalities [88] devoted less attention to the problems of the Ukrainians than to those of some other minorities. Ukrainian dissidents are also careful to distinguish between the Russian government and the Russian people, toward whom they have adopted a more generous attitude. Dzyuba has extended an olive branch to Russian dissidents by referring to the Russian nation as "one of the greatest and most glorious in the world."

Mutual distrust has also prevented an alliance between Jews and Ukrainian nationalists in the past, in spite of their common concern for minority rights. Historically the Ukraine has been regarded as one of the most anti-Semitic areas of the world. Many Ukrainian nationalists of the revolutionary period distrusted the Jews because of the heavy Jewish representation in Russian socialist parties. If the Jews were not regarded as Bolsheviks, they were often seen as allies of the Russians. Today, as in the past, very few Jews in the Ukraine speak Ukrainian. When they assimilate, they assimilate into Russian culture.

Today anti-Semitism in the Ukraine may be waning.* Since the 1960s Ukrainian dissidents have shown interest in cooperating with Jewish dissidents, partly for idealistic and partly for opportunistic reasons. Compared to the futile efforts of other Soviet minorities to have their grievances redressed, the Jews have had some success in approaching their objective of free emigration. The Jewish exodus has been particularly visible in the Ukraine. In 1974, 28 percent of Jewish emigrants came from the Ukraine, a considerably higher percentage than from any other republic. A disproportionate number of Jewish emigrants from the Ukraine evidently come from the western regions, where Ukrainian nationalism is strongest.[90] With the Jewish success so clearly before them, the Ukrainians doubtless recognize the advantage of associating their own cause with that of the Jews. Most Ukrainian nationalists, like other liberal-minded dissidents in the Soviet Union, sincerely support the right of the Jews to emigrate, but they do not want the agitation for Jewish rights to obscure the more general lack of civil liberties in the Soviet Union. They point out, as Moroz puts it, that today "the pale is legalized, and not as formerly just for Jews, but for everybody." In his 1966 commemorative speech at Babi Yar, the scene of the Nazi massacre of Kievan Jews in 1941, Dzyuba also related the plight of the Jews to that of all victims of state repression.

Ukrainian dissidents have charged the regime with actively working to frustrate Ukrainian overtures to the Jews. John Kolasky believed that authorities in Moscow were responsible for the publication in the Ukraine of an anti-Semitic tract in 1963, which allegedly made many Jews wary of expressing support for Ukrainian nationalism. A recent issue of the new *Ukrainian Herald* accuses the KGB of trying to set Jews and Ukrainians against each other by organizing pogroms, and by spreading rumors that the Jews wanted to carve a Jewish state out of the Ukraine. According to the *Herald,* "the chauvinists . . . failed to drive a wedge between Jews and Ukrainians." [91]

The advantages to the Jews of identifying their particular cause with a larger one are less clear. While Jewish leaders do not question the motives of Ukrainian intellectual dissidents, they remain dubious that Ukrainian nationalism at the popular level is truly purged of anti-Semitism. A Jewish emigre from the Ukraine explained their skepticism:

> Many Jews sympathized with the Ukraine nationalist movement, understanding the similarity of our interests. Yet there was widespread skepticism about the perspectives of this movement. From their experience Jews know that any kind of outburst of Ukrainian national feeling takes the form of a great Jewish pogrom.[92]

Relations between Jewish and Ukrainian dissidents are growing friendlier and there have been cases of cooperation for limited objectives, but it is unlikely that the Jews will rally with enthusiasm to the banner of Ukrainian nationalism.

Christian dissent also reinforces nationalist dissent, especially in the West Ukraine where the Uniate Church reputedly had some four million adherents at the time of its liquidation. There are indications of a religious revival taking place since

*As late as May 1972, however, a three-day riot in Dnepropetrovsk was reportedly touched off by a quarrel between a Ukrainian and a Jew.[89]

the 1960s. During the 1968 Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia some Ukrainians in Slovakia agitated for a return to the Uniate Church and a revival of the link with Rome. The increased attention given to anti-religious propaganda by the Soviet Ukrainian press since then indicates that former Uniates in the West Ukraine may have become restive also. Most of those Uniates arrested have been in the West Ukraine, but the most zealous Christian sect in the USSR, the Initsiativniki Baptists, appear to be active in the East Ukraine as well. They also appear to be attracting more young people than do the more traditional churches.

In recent years the cause of the Uniates has been taken up by Ukrainian nationalists, first by the *Ukrainian Herald,* and then by Moroz. In line with the attitudes of more traditional Ukrainian nationalists, Moroz believes the Uniate religion and Ukrainian nationalism are inseparable. "A fight against the Church is a fight against the culture," he maintains. In any case, he argues, religious believers should be defended, if for no other reason, merely because they are persecuted. "When religion was dominant and socialism was persecuted, a decent person did not say a word against socialism," he writes, and contends that now the roles are reversed.[93] Moroz has been particularly outspoken in his praise of the Hutsuls, a mountain people living in the East Carpathian region, who preserve old Ukrainian customs and the Uniate religion. Moroz's defense has emboldened them, and associated them with more general Ukrainian causes.

V. THE POLITICS OF NATIONALISM IN THE UKRAINE

As much as any elite group in the Ukraine, Ukrainian Party officials have a vested interest in the maintenance of the political system as it exists; indeed, they are part of that system. A ranking Party apparatchik has been conditioned by years of service in a Party imbued with hostility to minority nationalism. He has perforce propagated its line; he owes his station and his prestige not to the consent of the governed, but to a Party in which power flows from the center outward.

And yet, while Ukrainian Communist leaders owe their primary loyalty to the Party, they are not one-dimensional men. It is unreasonable to assume that they are necessarily devoid of any emotional attachment to their native region. In fact, few Ukrainian officials are so rigidly loyal to the center as to place the interests of the all-union Party always above those of the Ukraine, or so opportunistic as to be totally insensitive to the needs and desires of the people among whom they live. In varying degrees they are responsive to those desires, at times because of the practical difficulties encountered in administering unpopular central policies, at times because popular desires sometimes coincide with the Communist official's desire to win economic concessions for "his" region. A local official may also take pride in the achievements of his region and seek recognition for these, if only because such recognition reflects credit on him. To this extent, a local leader may develop a local loyalty which is scarcely distinguishable from nationalism, although its roots are different.

Moreover, a regional leader may attempt to manipulate nationalism as a lever for increasing his political clout in Moscow. Dependent on central favor for his rise in the Party, having risen he may become bolder and try to build an independent power base and a local constituency on his own. This is particularly true in an area where nationalist sentiments are not confined to an isolated segment of the population, but have infiltrated the Party itself. In spite of its natural appeal for an ambitious regional leader, such a course is risky in the extreme. By condoning the milder forms of nationalism, and relaxing the strictures against nationalist deviations in literature and scholarship, the regional leader may unintentionally unleash forces which he cannot easily control. In addition, if he goes too far, he will offend central authorities. Consequently, toleration of a measure of freedom of expression for "establishment" intellectuals with a nationalist orientation is not incompatible with repressive measures against more open and radical dissent.

A. Factionalism and Nationalism

In the 1960s and 1970s the attitude of a Ukrainian official toward nationalism has been influenced by his factional alignment.[94] Not all factions within the Ukrainian Party have given equal support to the centralizing initiatives of the Brezhnev years.

The faction centered in the eastern, urban, and Russified oblast of Dnepropetrovsk has throughout the last decade consistently been much more hostile toward Ukrainian nationalist dissent, and has generally championed economic centralization as well. The subservience of this group to Moscow owes much to the fact that its patrons there wield great power, and can bestow great rewards on their clients. Brezhnev served as a first secretary both of Dnepropetrovsk and of neighboring Zaporozhe. Kirilenko is a former first secretary of Dnepropetrovsk and also worked in the Party in Zaporozhe, and Shcherbitsky is a former first secretary of Dnepropetrovsk.

The faction centered in another eastern, industrial oblast, Donetsk, has played a more independent and ambiguous role. The Donetsk Party's membership grew rapidly throughout the 1960s, and it became the largest Party organization in the Ukraine. Because of the size of this faction and the economic importance of its geographic base, few Ukrainian leaders in recent years have been willing or able to ignore its interests altogether. Khrushchev seemed to act as Donetsk's patron, but his fall did not affect the fortunes of the faction adversely. Shelest may have attempted to win the support of Aleksandr Lyashko and his Donetsk followers by defending Donetsk economic interests. In turn, Lyashko and his cohorts may have given Shelest limited backing, but they kept their options open. According to Ukrainian *samizdat* the First Secretary of Donetsk obkom, Valdimir Degtyarev, was one of only three obkom first secretaries in the Ukraine who was openly hostile to Shelest during his time of troubles in May 1972.[95] Since Shelest's demise the Donetsk faction's numerical representation in central Party and government institutions has increased, and Donetsk men continue to be well placed in key oblasts. For the last five years the first secretaries of Kiev and Zaporozhe obkoms have been Donetsk proteges of Lyashko. Yet the seeming influence of the Donetsk faction has apparently not reaped them the same economic concessions under Shcherbitsky as they received under Shelest. The attitude of this group toward the ideological crackdown sponsored by Brezhnev and his Dnepropetrovsk supporters has been passive and equivocal. Donetsk is so Russified that the Party there may see no need to crack the whip on this issue. Only on economic issues have they spoken out, bitterly opposing central policies which slight the development of the Donbas coal industry.

The Kharkov faction's power was eclipsed after 1965, when its patron Podgorny unsuccessfully vied with Brezhnev for the succession. Brezhnev's victory over Podgorny was accompanied by an assault on the Kharkov Party organization. Its membership was cut back and its influence decreased. Since 1965 the Kharkov faction has disintegrated. Some of Podgorny's proteges in the Ukraine, notably Nikolay Sobol, removed as Ukrainian Second Secretary in 1965 and from the Ukrainian Politburo in 1972, suffered demotions. Other Kharkov leaders, notably Gregory Vashchenko, who became First Secretary of Kharkov obkom only after Podgorny's departure from the Ukraine and had no clear ties to Podgorny, have fared better. While some Kharkovians, perhaps including Podgorny himself, may have favored lenient treatment of liberal writers, in 1968 Vashchenko joined Aleksey Vatchenko, Scherbitsky's man in Dnepropetrovsk, to attack dissident writers.

The Kiev Party's importance increased during the tenure of Petr Shelest, Party boss of the Ukraine from 1963 to 1972. Shelest began his Party career in Kharkov and may have owed his elevation to the First Secretaryship to Podgorny's favor. As First Secretary of Kiev obkom from 1957 to 1962, he placed old Kharkov associates in several key positions. Under Shcherbitsky the political power of the Kiev organization has been drastically reduced.

B. The Case of Shelest: A Vassal Who Loved His Fief

The case of Petr Shelest, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party from 1963 until May 1972, provides an example of a feudal vassal who became so attached to his fief that he incurred the wrath of his lords. In May 1972 Shelest was dismissed as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party and appointed a Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Less than a year later he was dismissed from this position and retired from the CPSU Central Committee Politburo on pension. Shelest's

Petr Shelest, ousted in 1972 as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party

removal from the Politburo was preceded by heavy criticism of his alleged nationalist deviations. Some Western students, in a display of Kremlinological dexterity, have argued that since nationalism was the only public charge levelled against Shelest, it could not have been the real reason for his removal. Yet an examination of the evidence suggests that, while no single-factor explanation is satisfactory, Shelest's identification with and toleration of Ukrainian national sentiment played a major—if not the major—role in paving the way for his ouster.

Shelest's fall could plausibly be explained in terms of power politics, pure and simple. Shcherbitsky, Shelest's replacement as Ukrainian Party boss, belonged to the close-knit faction of "Dnepropetrovtsy"; he had old and fast ties to Brezhnev, and a long-standing rivalry with Shelest. According to this thesis, for many years Brezhnev had been "gunning" for Shelest, and hoping to replace him with his client Shcherbitsky. Conversely, Shelest's opposition to Brezhnev's policies may have been rooted in power considerations rather than in genuine policy differences. Certainly Shelest displayed a conspicuous lack of deference toward Brezhnev, and played down the General Secretary's personal contributions. This argument, based on the use of a "patron-client" model of political mobility, is probably true as far as it goes. Its weakness is that it cannot adequately account for the decision of other Politburo members to go along with the sacking of Shelest. To gain their approval, Brezhnev probably needed an issue with which to fault Shelest. Thus, while Brezhnev may have regarded policy "mistakes" by Shelest merely as an excuse for moving against him, policy differences may have constituted the real reason that other Politburo members concurred in this action.

At the time of Shelest's departure it was widely speculated in the West that he was removed because of his opposition to detente in general and to President Nixon's May 1972 visit to the Soviet Union in particular. The timing of his removal as First Secretary does suggest that this was the immediate cause for the showdown. The decision to remove him came between Nixon's announcement on 8 May of his decision to mine Haiphong harbor and Nixon's arrival in Moscow on 21 May.* Shelest's opposition to this visit was in line with his long-standing advocacy of heavy defense spending, and his generally bellicose attitude toward the West. At a time when Brezhnev was committing the Soviet Union to a detente policy and negotiating a limited SALT agreement, in a June 1971 speech Shelest had berated "the policy of US imperialism, which presents the greatest threat to universal peace," and called for an increase in the defensive might of the Soviet Union.[96] Shelest is said to have advocated all-out attack on the US fleet after Nixon's decision, and to have argued vehemently at the Central Committee plenum of 19 May 1972 in favor of revoking Nixon's invitation. A visit to Kiev was a scheduled part of Nixon's itinerary, and Shelest is rumored to have declared that if Nixon came he would find "the gates of Kiev shut before him." Shelest's behavior at a state banquet for the Nixon entourage, when he declined to drink the toast to the SALT agreement, until per-

*Shelest remained on the Politburo until 27 April 1973.

suaded by Shelepin, seemed to confirm his negative attitude toward the visit.[97]

Opposition to the visit may have triggered the decision to sack Shelest, but it alone does not suffice as an explanation for his departure, since there were signs that Brezhnev had already laid the groundwork for pushing him out. In March 1971 three of Brezhnev's supporters were added to the Politburo. The addition of Shcherbitsky, Premier of the Ukraine, created the highly unusual and ominous circumstance of two representatives of the Ukrainian apparat sitting as full members of the Politburo. At the same time, Shelest was losing his grip over his own bailiwick. The most glaring sign that he might no longer be master of his house was the appointment in July 1970 of a new KGB chief for the Ukraine, Vitaly Fedorchuk, reportedly over Shelest's strong protest. According to rumor, Shelest was completely taken aback by Fedorchuk's appointment and refused even to shake hands with him when he arrived in Kiev.[98]

Shelest had been out of step on foreign policy issues other than detente with the US. Consistent with Ukraine's World War II memories, he had questioned the wisdom of rapprochement with West Germany. In a 1969 speech at a ceremony in Kiev marking the 25th anniversary of the liberation of the Ukraine from Nazi occupation, Shelest let out all stops in conjuring up memories of Nazi war atrocities in the Ukraine. Reminding his audience that "imperalists have long cast envious glances on the Ukraine's wealth," and that "in this century alone they twice pounced on the Ukraine," he noted that "the present international situation demands that the lessons of the past be taken into account," since "international imperialism is striving to unleash a new world war." Not content with such generalities, he explicitly tried to discredit Brandt's Ostpolitik:

> The West German leaders misname their foreign policy line the policy of building bridges. However, the crux of the matter is not in the name but in the fact that West German ruling circles count on subverting the unity of socialist countries, on tearing off this or that piece from the socialist camp. But these lunatic plans of West German revanchists will never become a reality.[99]

Pravda's version of this speech omitted these references to imperialist designs. Shelest later changed sails and in his March 1971 report to the 24th Ukrainian Congress, on the eve of the 24th CPSU Congress, he endorsed the new treaty with West Germany. But it is doubtful that his views had changed completely. In a June 1971 speech in Kiev he again recalled past German cupidity, insisting that "we have no right to forget, must not forget" the events of World War II.[100]

It is doubtful that Shelest's hawkish behavior during the Czech crisis significantly weakened his position, although this story seems to have been put out by Soviet leaders. After Shelest's removal a Central Committee letter, which was reportedly circulated to local Party committees throughout the USSR and sent to Czech Secretary Husak, tried to saddle Shelest with the blame for the invasion. The letter reportedly accused him of giving the Politburo misleading information, on the basis of which the leadership decided no solution other than invasion was feasible. A similar charge—that Shelest had tricked Brezhnev into invading—was leaked to an Associated Press newsman in December 1972. Other reports indicate that in 1972 Brezhnev gave Tito a similar explanation for the invasion.[101] It is unlikely that the Politburo would have relied so completely on Shelest for information in such a crucial matter. More likely these "leaks" were self-serving disinformation prompted by Brezhnev's desire to find a scapegoat to bear the onus of responsibility for the invasion.

Other factors no doubt contributed to Shelest's demise: his evident footdragging on Brezhnev's promotion of consumer welfare; his alleged abuse of the privileges of his office and "offenses against socialist property," particularly in catering to the extravagant whims of his wife; his failure to bridle his son, who had promoted closer scholarly ties to the West;[102] a possible disagreement with Brezhnev over the issuance of new Party cards, perhaps because Brezhnev wanted the Ukrainian Party to reduce the size of its rapidly growing membership via a purge.

Some combination of foreign policy differences and personal failings might suffice to explain Shelest's dismissal. Yet none of his "mistakes" in these areas seems serious enough to account for the intensity of the public criticism which accompanied his demise. In the end, Shelest's "nationalism" must

be figured into the equation. Perhaps most obnoxious was his daring defense of Ukrainian economic interests.

Ukrainian administrators, like those of other union republics, have sought to develop a balanced economy and have complained of discrimination in central investment policies. The competition between the Eastern RSFSR and the Ukraine has been intense. In the 1960s Ukrainian economists led an unsuccessful fight for building hydroelectric power stations on the Dnepr rather than in Siberia, charged that the Ukrainian chemical industry was being sacrificed to the rush to develop Siberia at all costs, and complained that the Ukrainian machine industry was forced to import products from other republics, although the basis for the production of such products existed in the Ukraine itself.[103] A *Political Diary* article of 1965 noted the vehemence with which Ukrainian administrators insisted that the Ukraine was economically exploited by Russia, and declared "openly that they are being robbed."[104]

During the last few years, when priority has been given to the development of oil and gas industry in Siberia, the coal "lobby" of Donetsk has been particularly vocal in charging unfair treatment by central authorities. In 1971 Shelest added his voice to their protests. At the 24th Ukrainian Party Congress in March 1971 he lamented that in the past five years only two new mines were constructed in the Donbas, and regretted that "unfortunately, Gosplan and the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry do not give sufficient attention to these matters." At the 24th CPSU Congress he praised the work of the Ukrainian coal industry, noted its important contribution to the Soviet economy, reiterated that the increase in the industry's potentials had been carried out at an exceedingly slow pace, and added:

> Some people try to assert that the part played by gas and oil in the fuel balance is increasing, and therefore it is said that the attention paid to developing the coal industry can be reduced. We believe this is wrong.

Donetsk First Secretary Degtyarev, doubtless grateful for Shelest's support, registered a similar complaint at the Congress, and stated that "we fully share" Shelest's concerns in this matter. After the Congress, presumably in an effort to soothe Ukrainian tempers, a CPSU Central Committee decree announced sharply increased investments in new mines in the Donbas. In April 1972 Degtyarev revealed that seven new mines were scheduled to be opened in the Donbas by 1975. After Shelest's removal these investments may have been cut back again. In a November 1972 article Degtyarev complained that "the miners of the Donbas have the right to expect more effective assistance from the USSR Ministry of Coal Industry." At a December 1972 Supreme Soviet session Donetsk leaders Lyashko and Aleksey Titarenko complained that the Ukrainian coal industry was suffering from the postponement of the scheduled opening of new mines and the modernization of old ones.[105]

Shelest's "nationalism" went beyond economic matters. He also appeared reluctant to throw his full weight behind campaigns to repress nationalist dissent. This attitude appeared in all three of the major crackdowns during his tenure—in 1965-66, in 1968 and in 1972. During the witchhunt of 1965-66, while Shelest dutifully staged trials of dissidents in the Ukraine, he is reported to have granted an interview to the wife of one of the accused promising an open and fair trial for her husband.[106] Later, in 1968, Vitaly Nikitchenko, the then chief of the Ukrainian KGB, probably with Shelest's approval is reported to have refused an order delivered by a KGB official sent from Moscow to arrest Dzyuba, allegedly because he believed such an action would incite new protests.[107]

While Shelest lashed out at Ukrainian separatism and "bourgeois" nationalism, possibly in an effort to prove his ideological purity, he simultaneously permitted and even encouraged literary expressions of national pride. At the Fifth Ukrainian Writers' Union Congress of 1966, noted for the openness of its proceedings, he paid a tribute to the efforts of writers to preserve the Ukrainian language:

> Under these conditions [of equality of nationalities] our own Ukrainian literature and art are flourishing and strengthening. . . . It is imperative to treat our own beautiful Ukrainian language with care and respect. This is our treasure and great legacy which must be respected and cultivated. . . . The Communist Party always has supported and always will support in the future your effort in this direction.[108]

The tone of his speech contrasted sharply with that of Vasily Kozachenko, a leading Russifier on the board of the Writers' Union.

Evidently supporting a policy of limited Ukrainization, Shelest took concrete steps in 1965 to encourage the use of the Ukrainian language in education. In August of that year the Ukrainian Minister of Higher Education, Yury Dadenkov, called in the rectors of higher educational establishments and instructed them in writing to give lectures "predominantly in Ukrainian." This instruction, which must have been sanctioned by the First Secretary, was reportedly countermanded by central authorities after an orchestrated letter-writing campaign of aggrieved parents who did not want their children "denied" the opportunity of a Russian education.[109] Again in 1968 Shelest reportedly ordered that college textbooks be published "first of all, in the Ukrainian language." The delegation of Canadian Communists who visited the Ukraine in early 1967 also maintained that Shelest, in contrast to some other high officials in the Ukraine, favored the preservation of the Ukrainian language.[110] As late as May 1971, at a speech to the Ukrainian Writers' Union Congress, Shelest stated that "We should oppose . . . the practice of littering our language," a phrase invariably used to refer to the influx of Russian words into the Ukrainian language.[111]

Shelest seemed to oppose other forms of Russification as well. In his report to the 23rd Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in March 1966, he condemned both "bourgeois nationalism" and "great-power chauvinism." In Soviet parlance the former is synonymous with minority nationalism and the latter with Russian nationalism. While opposition to "bourgeois nationalism" is and was *de rigueur*, placing "great-power chauvinism" on the same plane had become strictly *passé* by 1966.[112]

Shelest's reshuffling of the Ukraine's ideological staff in 1968 had the effect of putting men more lenient toward nationalist dissent in key positions. In March 1968 Andrey Skaba, a reputed Russifier, was replaced as ideology secretary by an academic, Fedor Ovcharenko. Following Ovcharenko's appointment, the head of the Department of Science and Culture of the Ukrainian Central Committee, and the chief editor of *Kommunist Ukrainy* were removed. The new editor of *Kommunist Ukrainy* was believed by some observers to favor greater local political autonomy.

Although Ovcharenko warned against the danger of alien ideologies imported from abroad, like Shelest he seems to have done what he could behind the scenes to defend Ukrainian intellectuals. According to a 1969 report he told sometime dissident Zina Franko that he was looking after her welfare, but that he could do nothing to help Dzyuba and Svitlychny because if he tried to, "I would lose my head."[113] Ovcharenko was reportedly summoned in the summer of 1970 to Moscow, where Suslov upbraided him for failing to control nationalism in the Ukraine. Ovcharenko allegedly responded that it was first necessary to eliminate Russian chauvinism.*[114]

Another Shelest protege, Ukrainian Cinema Committee Chairman Svyatoslav Ivanov was removed under a cloud in April 1972 for having allowed the release of an "ideologically harmful film." Shelest himself is reported to have quashed the release in 1971 of a propaganda film "exposing" the atrocities of the *banderovtsy*, a Ukrainian separatist group active during World War II, and during his tenure the Ukrainian media reportedly received explicit instructions to play up Ukrainian economic achievements and to downgrade all-union events.[116]

Shelest clearly bucked central authority in defending Oles Honchar. In April 1968 Honchar's novel *Sobor*, which had earlier received favorable reviews in Dnepropetrovsk newspapers and also in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, came under fire from the Dnepropetrovsk Party organization, with the enthusiastic support of Writers' Union officials Kozachenko and Mykola Shamota. Hostile reviews of the novel were confined to Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe local papers until late April, when they spread to republic-level papers. In June they were followed up in the central press with an article in *Sovetskaya Kultura* by Anatoly Ulanov, First Secretary of Dnepropetrovsk gorkom.[117]

In spite of the fact that Brezhnev and other high authorities probably approved of the campaign

*One Soviet defector reported that Ovcharenko's relations with Shelest were strained after 1971;[115] if so, Ovcharenko was nevertheless retained in office during Shelest's tenure.

against Honchar, his position in the Writers' Union was only gradually weakened. In December 1968 he was forced to share his authority with Kozachenko; it was announced that the two men would decide all questions jointly. In less than two months, however, Honchar was again elevated to be sole chairman and Kozachenko demoted to one of several deputy chairmen. In May 1971 the long-delayed blow came; Honchar was retired from the chairmanship, but with full honors. He was replaced not by Kozachenko, but by Yury Smolich, who had remained publicly neutral in the *Sobor* controversy. Not until March 1973 after the removal of Shelest did Kozachenko reap the full reward of victory and ascend to the chairmanship.

Obviously, in order for Honchar to have clung to his post for so long under such circumstances, someone with power must have been looking out for him. Clandestine reporting, circumstantial evidence, and logic all indicate that Shelest was his protector. Honchar, according to one report, was close to Shelest, and sometimes wrote speeches for him.[118] Certainly Honchar went out of his way to curry Shelest's favor, praising his book, his sincere interest in Ukrainian literature, and his "desire to help . . . to support all that is honest, creative, and talented." As for Shelest, only in one statement did he come close to deprecating Honchar, although he must have been under intense pressure to do so. According [redacted] for example, in the spring of 1970, Ponomarev and Suslov made a foray into the Ukraine, where they upbraided the Party for failing to take adequate measures to quell nationalist dissent. At the 24th Ukrainian Party Congress in 1971, Shelest stated that "not only young but sometimes even well-known writers" produced "politically immature" works. He repeated this veiled rebuke at the Writers' Union Congress which retired Honchar.[119]

Shelest's protective hand can also be seen in the strange history of Ivan Dzyuba. In 1964 Dzyuba, who already had a reputation as a spirited defender of Ukrainian culture, was reportedly requested by high Ukrainian Party officials to write a study of Party nationality policy. In 1965 when he completed his study, which turned out to be a powerful critique of Russifying policies, he sent it to Shelest, who reportedly circulated the manuscript to Ukrainian Party secretaries for their comments and consideration. Such a document obviously aroused controversy, and Andrey Skaba, then Ukrainian ideology secretary, reportedly suggested to Shelest during this period that Dzyuba should be arrested. Shelest allegedly responded with the remark that "he was not Kaganovich and these were not the times of Stalin."[120] Although Dzyuba was detained for questioning by the police in connection with the trials of 1965, he was soon released. The unauthorized publication of Dzyuba's study in the West in 1968, as *Internationalism or Russification?*, however, provided his opponents grounds for assailing him as a collaborator of Ukrainian emigre "bourgeois nationalists." During the course of the campaign against him, in 1969 Dzyuba was expelled from the local Kiev branch of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, but was reinstated by the republic Writers' Union after he made a carefully worded statement denying that he was a "nationalist." Although he continued to pen protest articles, he seemed immune from more serious forms of persecution until 1972, when Shelest's own position had deteriorated. After being briefly arrested in January 1972, he was expelled from the Ukrainian Writers' Union in March, re-arrested in April, tried and given a five-year prison sentence in March 1973, then permitted or pressured into writing an "apology" in November 1973, after which he was pardoned and released.[121]

Perhaps the best evidence of Shelest's nationalist sympathies surfaced when, in 1970, he published a book, *O Ukraine, Our Soviet Land*, which betrayed an unseemly national pride. Although the book at first received laudatory reviews, it contained passages which could be and later were used as ammunition against Shelest. In particular, Shelest contributed to the growing "Cossack cult" in the Ukraine. He treated the Zaporozhian Sich with sympathy, referring to its "democratic structure" in which "all Cossacks had equal rights," quoting from Marx's complimentary description of the Cossack community, charging that Polish and Russian historians had "grossly falsified" the history of the Sich, and admonishing Ukrainian historians to pay more attention to the "great progressive role" played by the Cossacks. He also had harsh words for the Russian Tsars, whose "cruel" policies had "de-

stroyed the freedom of the Ukrainian people," and fastened serfdom on the Ukrainian peasantry.[122]

Although the book was printed in a large edition of 100,000 copies, these soon sold out. Since it was not reprinted, and within a year was reportedly being removed from libraries, by 1972 excerpts of the book began to circulate in *samizdat*. According to clandestine reporting, the book was discussed at a Politburo meeting in 1972, presumably when the groundwork for Shelest's removal was being laid. After quoting some damaging sections, either Brezhnev or Suslov pronounced that "this is where nationalism begins."[123]

Only in April 1973, after Shelest had already lost his position in the Ukraine, did a devastating review of the book appear as the coup de grace and signal for his final disgrace, removal from the Politburo. Tucked away on the back pages of *Kommunist Ukrainy*,[124] the review laid bare Shelest's sins in shockingly blunt language. Never before had a Politburo member been subjected to such blatant public criticism from any organ below the Central Committee or its executive organs. One by one the book's "serious shortcomings" were ticked off. The author devoted too much space to the pre-October history of the Ukraine, particularly to the Cossacks, and he "says nothing about the class stratification of the Cossacks." He is said to view Ukrainian history "to a certain degree in isolation" from that of the USSR as a whole, thus failing to elucidate the "friendship of nations" which cements the country together. On speaking of the reunification of the Ukraine with Russia, he "never mentioned that, thanks to this historic act, the Ukrainian people were saved from foreign enslavement." He supposedly failed to reveal "the beneficial influence of Russian culture" on the Ukrainian arts. While waxing eloquent on the economic achievements of the Ukrainian SSR, he somehow neglected to mention that these were the "result not only of the heroic labor of the workers of the Ukraine, but also of all peoples of the USSR." Finally, *horrible dictu*, "elements of economic autarky are obvious in the book." The following issue of *Kommunist Ukrainy* contained an article written by Shcherbitsky, Shelest's successor in the Ukraine, which faulted unnamed Ukrainian writers for "national conceit and narrowmindedness."[125]

The latest issues of the *Ukrainian Herald*, only excerpts of which are thus far available to us, are reported to explain Shelest's removal in terms of his "nationalism." According to this account Shelest intervened to save Vasily Kutsevol, First Secretary of Lvov obkom, whom Suslov wanted to oust for errors in "internationalist and atheistic education of the masses." This action afforded his enemies, Fedorchuk, Valentyn Malanchuk and Shcherbitsky the opportunity to complain to Moscow about Shelest, and ultimately Shelest was summoned to Moscow, where he was put in the "penal chair" at a Politburo meeting and charged with "provincialism and national narrow-mindedness." The *Ukrainian Herald* claimed that Shelest had the support of most of the obkom first secretaries in the Ukraine, and also of several non-Russian Party leaders in other republics. Perhaps for this reason, Shelest was not permitted to return to Kiev to attend the Ukrainian plenum which ousted him.[126]

Shelest's "nationalism" may have gone no deeper than the desire of an independent-minded regional leader to strengthen his power base. His opposition to Brezhnev's personal ascendancy may have been partly due to a belief that as a regional leader he would have more power under a collective central leadership than under one-man rule. Whether Shelest sincerely sympathized with some forms of Ukrainian national sentiment, or whether he turned to nationalist elements only in an effort to drum up support for a personal vendetta with Brezhnev, we cannot know. Of greater concern here than Shelest's personal motivation is the fact that he did act in ways which associated him to a degree with Ukrainian national feeling. There is no reason to doubt that nationalism in the broadest sense—manifested in Shelest's book, his protection of some dissident writers, his championing of the Ukrainian language, his advocacy of economic decentralization, his defense of Donbas coal interests, even perhaps in his suspicion of West German motives—constituted a major part of the case against him.

C. The Case of Shcherbitsky: As Royalist as the King

Thus far, First Secretary Shcherbitsky has done nothing to blemish his reputation as "Brezhnev's man in the Ukraine." He has purged trouble spots

in the Ukrainian cadre, mounted a major assault on Ukrainian nationalist dissent, and given enthusiastic support to Brezhnev's policies. Although he has not groveled in the manner of some Central Asian leaders, he has offered the requisite amount of public praise for his chief, and has gone out of his way to emphasize that the Ukrainian Party looks to Moscow for its marching orders.

Soon after taking charge in the Ukraine in May 1972, Shcherbitsky evidently moved to curtail the growth of the Ukrainian Party, whose membership had increased at a speed which may have alarmed Brezhnev. From 1966 to 1972 the Ukrainian Party grew at a faster rate than the all-union Party. In 1972 its membership dropped by 2.2 percent, while the membership of the all-union Party rose by 1.3 percent.[127]

Shcherbitsky has also taken steps to consolidate his position in central Ukrainian institutions. During Shcherbitsky's tenure three new full members and four new candidate members have been added to the Ukrainian Politburo. On the enlarged Politburo Shcherbitsky's Party Secretariat has more representatives than the government, which had not been the case with Shelest's Politburo, when Shcherbitsky was Premier.

At least in terms of numerical superiority in ruling institutions, the Donetsk faction is now in the ascendancy. Aleksandr Lyashko, head of the Donetsk group, filled the post Shcherbitsky vacated as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. His faction is represented on the Politburo by four full members—Lyashko, Vladimir Degtyarev, Aleksey Titarenko, and Vitaly Sologub—and two candidate members—Vladimir Tsybulko and Yakov Pogrebnyak—and on the Secretariat by Titarenko and Pogrebnyak. On the Ukrainian Central Committee elected in 1971 the Donetsk Party organization was represented by 14 full members (out of 148).

The Dnepropetrovsk faction is represented on the Politburo by Shcherbitsky, Aleksey Vatchenko, and probably Ivan Grushetsky. Vashchenko, the Kharkov man who has acted like a Brezhnev ally, was transferred from First Secretary of Kharkov to First Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, retaining his full membership on the Politburo. Of the candidate members Vitaly Fedorchuk and Valentyn Malanchuk are Brezhnev allies, and Malanchuk also sits with Shcherbitsky on the Secretariat. On the Ukrainian Central Committee elected in 1971, Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe provided 13 full members.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UKRAINE POLITBURO

Members	Other positions
*BORISENKO, Nikolay Mikhaylovich	Secretary, CPUk Central Committee
DEGTYAREV, Vladimir Ivanovich	First Secretary, Donetsk Oblast Party Committee
*GRUSHETSKY, Ivan Samoylovich	Chairman, Presidium, UkSSR Supreme Soviet
KALCHENKO, Nikifor Timofeyevich	First Deputy Chairman, UkSSR Council of Ministers
LUTAK, Ivan Kondratyevich	Second Secretary, CPUk Central Committee
LYASHKO, Aleksandr Pavlovich	Chairman, UkSSR Council of Ministers
SHCHERBITSKY, Vladimir Vasilyevich	First Secretary, CPUk Central Committee; Member, Politburo, CPSU Central Committee
*SOLOGUB, Vitaly Alekseyevich	Chairman, UkSSR Council of Trade Unions
TITARENKO, Aleksey Antonovich	Secretary, CPUk Central Committee
VASHCHENKO, Grigory Ivanovich	First Deputy Chairman, UkSSR Council of Ministers
VATCHENKO, Aleksey Fedoseyevich	First Secretary, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Committee
Candidate members	**Other positions**
*FEDORCHUK, Vitaly Vasilyevich	Chairman, UkSSR KGB
*MALANCHUK, Valentyn Yefimovich	Secretary, CPUk Central Committee
POGREBNYAK, Yakov Petrovich	Secretary, CPUk Central Committee
*SOKOLOV, Ivan Zakharovich	First Secretary, Kharkov Oblast Party Committee
*TSYBULKO, Vladimir Mikhaylovich	First Secretary, Kiev Oblast Party Committee

*Elected since 19 May 1972.

The former strongholds of Podgorny and Shelest have deteriorated. In 1971 Kharkov and Kiev were cut back to six full members each on the Ukrainian Central Committee. Nikifor Kalchenko is the only holdover from Podgorny's "old guard" remaining on the Politburo; he is probably little more than a figurehead today. The only presumed Shelest ally remaining on the Politburo is Ivan Lutak, who served with Shelest in Kiev in the 1950s, then as his deputy in the central Ukrainian secretariat. Unlike Lyashko, he has no strong geographic base of support, but he occupies the important post of Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Party. Shcherbitsky would probably be happy to be rid of him.

The composition of Party leadership on the oblast level has also been in flux. Since Shcherbitsky's takeover 10 of the 25 Ukrainian obkoms have undergone changes of first secretaries. Most of these were removed during Shcherbitsky's first year-and-a-half in office, and several were charged with "shortcomings" in work. In addition, many oblasts lost other secretaries. Kherson, Poltava, and Voroshilovgrad obkoms, as well as Kiev gorkom, appear to have been subjected to full-scale purges; Lvov, Chernovtsy, and Odessa have also been hard hit. Many of those deposed had ties to Shelest or Podgorny.

Shcherbitsky has also taken steps to increase his control over the Party organization of the capital city. He has been critical of the performance of the Kiev Party, and since January 1972 all Party secretaries of Kiev gorkom except for First Secretary Aleksandr Botvin have been replaced. At the same time, in May 1975 Shcherbitsky separated the Kiev gorkom Party organization from the obkom organization and placed it under the direct supervision of the Ukrainian Central Committee.[128] With the city Party split off, the remaining oblast Party has become a "rump." Having lost over half of its membership, the size of the oblast Party falls behind that of at least six other Ukrainian oblasts. The status of Kiev city will now be similar to that of the Moscow city organization, which is larger than the Moscow oblast Party and not subordinated to it. This arrangement augurs ill for the political fortunes of Vladimir Tsybulko, First Secretary of Kiev obkom and a Donetsk protege of Lyashko, and the political position of Botvin is also shaky. Although Botvin could probably not be accused of ideological laxity, having earlier played an active role in preventing the spread of the Czech "disease," he has career ties to Shelest. Botvin, like Shelest, rose in the Kharkov Party organization, and served under Shelest in Kiev obkom.

At least six of the departing obkom first secretaries were replaced not through promotions from within their own oblasts, the policy generally followed during the Brezhnev years, but by men brought in from outside. Not surprisingly, many of these appointees either belonged to the Dnepropetrovsk faction or came out of Shcherbitsky's Central Committee apparatus. Fedor Morgun, the new Poltava First Secretary, was clearly a Brezhnev protege, who was educated in Dnepropetrovsk, and worked with Brezhnev in Kazakhstan. Viktor Dobrik, who took over in Lvov, was a former First Secretary of Dneprodzerzhinsk gorkom and a Brezhnev sycophant of many years.

Several of the new appointees had been conspicuously active in campaigns against nationalist

Vladimir Shcherbitsky, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party

dissent. Dobrik had been sent to Ivano-Frankovsk as a troubleshooter in 1969; he now went to Lvov in the wake of anti-Russian demonstrations there. Both Ivan Mozgovoy, sent to Kherson, and Vladimir Dikusarov, dispatched to the Western oblast of Chernovtsy, had served as deputies of Transcarpathia First Secretary Ilnitsky. Ilnitsky had been shot into prominence during the Czech crisis by his relentless struggle against dissent.

Of obkom first secretaries today, only two appear to have been proteges of Shelest. Their posts are in the relatively unimportant oblasts of Khmelnitsky and Kirovograd.

The central Ukrainian ideological apparat has undergone an even more thorough housecleaning. The key step was taken in October 1972 when Ovcharenko was replaced by Malanchuk, who as an ideology secretary in Lvov had built a career as a virulent crusader against dissent. Since 1967 as Deputy Minister of Education he had reinforced this reputation as a Russifier in numerous tracts extolling the virtues of the "friendship of nations."[129] Malanchuk and Shcherbitsky have restaffed cultural and ideological departments of the Ukrainian Central Committee. Other cultural institutions and organs, as well as several institutes of the Ukrainian Academy of Science were also caught up in the purge.

MAJOR UKRAINIAN CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS RESTAFFED SINCE 1972

- Head of Central Committee Propaganda Department
- Head of Central Committee Department for Scientific and Educational Institutions
- Head of Central Committee Department of Organizational Party Work
- Head of Central Committee Cultural Department
- Chief Editor, *Kommunist Ukrainy*
- Chief Editor, *Literaturna Ukraina*
- Chief Editor, Soviet Writers' Publishing House
- Chairman, State Committee for Cinematography
- Minister of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education
- Chairman of Writers' Union
- First Secretary of Komsomol
- Rector of Higher Party School

The KGB had been taken out of Shelest's hands in the summer of 1970 when the central KGB, a

Vitaly Fedorchuk, head of the Ukrainian KGB

stronghold of Brezhnev, had imposed Fedorchuk on Shelest. Vitaly Nikitchenko, a Kharkov man, had headed the Ukrainian KGB since its formation in 1954. The length of his tenure suggests that he was a professional who remained aloof from political infighting or enjoyed protection from a higher leader like Podgorny. He was reportedly inclined toward leniency in handling dissent. Fedorchuk, by contrast, came from outside the Ukrainian apparat, although he is an ethnic Ukrainian. A veteran of service in Beria's security apparatus, he appears to be close to Brezhnev's clients in the central KGB[130] and may wield some authority independent of Shcherbitsky. Fedorchuk clearly came to the Ukraine with a mandate to rout nationalist dissidents.

Shcherbitsky has rallied this revitalized apparat in a major crusade against dissent. An intensive effort has been made to step up the ideological education of young people, and oblast ideological

Valentyn Malanchuk, ideology secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party

conferences have whipped the cadres into action. Lvov has been the chief target in this campaign. Two sensational trials of tourists, accused of being agitators sent into the Ukraine by emigre organizations of Ukrainian nationalists, have been staged there. Arrests and dismissals have kept the University of Lvov in turmoil. The regime has succeeded in persuading several well-known dissidents to recant—notably Ivan Dzyuba and Zina Franko, the granddaughter of the celebrated Ukrainian nationalist poet Ivan Franko, and a leading defender of Ukrainian culture.[131] Many other dissidents have been driven underground. The offensive has gone so far that on one occasion Malanchuk was reportedly deterred by a commission sent by central authorities from going through with a planned trial in Lvov.[132]

Shcherbitsky has also trumpeted Brezhnev's pet economic policies: the primacy of the Party's role in economic administration, the high priority of developing the oil and gas industry, the push to develop Siberia. In the 1960s Shcherbitsky was not so docile. On at least two occasions he openly took to task policies of all-union administrators.[133] Today Shcherbitsky has curbed his parochial appetite. In an effort to sell the policy of developing the eastern RSFSR, Shcherbitsky has repeatedly reminded his audience that the Ukraine owes a large debt to the Russians for its economic development. Now, he argues, it is the turn of Siberia.[134]

Shcherbitsky has also paid homage to the "immense historical role" of the Great Russians. Typical was a March 1974 *Kommunist Ukrainy* article denouncing the nationalist emigre "riff-raff" for maligning the "high spiritual dignity of Russian man." He wrote of the virtues of "Russian man" in rhapsodic fashion, concluding that "whoever offends the Russian people offends all Soviet people."

Shcherbitsky wrote a major article on nationality relations for the December 1974 issue of *Kommunist*. This article contained no sharp departures from the policy Brezhnev outlined at the fiftieth anniversary celebration, but in the process of enlarging on some of Brezhnev's pronouncements it toned them down somewhat, and conveyed a sense of reassurance to the nationalities.

It is possible that Shcherbitsky is trying to broaden the base of his personal popularity by backing off somewhat from his harsh stand on national aspirations. With his chief ailing, Shcherbitsky is stepping forth as a "comer" in the Politburo, writing frequently on economic questions as well as on the nationalities problem; but there are no signs of any divergence between Brezhnev and Shcherbitsky. The more soothing tone of Shcherbitsky's article may reflect Brezhnev's desire to decelerate his Russification program rather than any move by Shcherbitsky to dissociate himself from Brezhnev's policy.

Even if Shcherbitsky were so inclined, it would probably be politically disadvantageous for him to adopt a lenient attitude toward the grievances of

the nationalities. Shcherbitsky's greatest liability as a candidate for Brezhnev's mantle is probably his close association with the Ukraine. If angling for the succession, he would probably lean over backwards to prove his loyalty to Brezhnev and his ideological purity on the issue of nationality rights.

VI. THE UKRAINE IN THE YEARS AHEAD

In an effort to evaluate the strength of centrifugal forces in the Ukraine, we have broken the Ukrainian problem down into its component parts. First, we have seen that the Ukrainians possess most of the ingredients necessary for political self-sufficiency. For a people who have not enjoyed independent statehood in modern times, they have an unusually rich cultural heritage and retain a degree of pride that they are more "European" than the Great Russians. They have a relatively balanced economy, and over the last half century they have been transformed from a peasant people into a nation with a diversified class structure.

Yet our survey of linguistic and demographic trends suggests that time may be on the side of the forces of assimilation, at least in the East Ukraine. Linguistic Russification is proceeding steadily in the urban areas of East Ukraine. Although most Ukrainians there continue to think of themselves as Ukrainians, and continue to claim Ukrainian as their native tongue, the Russian language is replacing Ukrainian in official and public communications. The use of Russian in public may be largely due to official pressure, but many Ukrainians themselves have come to feel that speaking Ukrainian is "nekulturnyi" or unsophisticated. The process is slow, but the Russian element in the East Ukraine is growing, particularly in the cities, through assimilation of Ukrainians and migration of Russians.

In West Ukraine the statistics tell a somewhat different story. West Ukraine has more than held its own against Russian encroachments. This fact points to another dimension of the Ukrainian problem. The history, culture, and religion of East Ukraine have to a great degree been intertwined with the Russians, but the Soviet annexation of West Ukraine introduced into the Soviet system an alien and generally hostile population which can be Russified, if at all, only through a massive and prolonged effort.

While assimilation is gradually taking place in East Ukraine, this does not preclude the possibility that Ukrainian opposition to Russian rule may be increasing, partly because of the West Ukrainian infection. The two tendencies would not necessarily be incompatible. The very forces of urbanization, social mobilization, and mass education which work to efface national differences in the long run may simultaneously heighten consciousness of those differences in the short run. In fact, Ukrainian nationalism does appear to be growing, or at least becoming more vocal. During the last several decades Ukrainian dissent has undergone an evolution—from the armed resistance of World War II, to the formation of conspiratorial groups in the 1950s, to the flourishing of open protest in the 1960s. Overt dissent probably reached its peak in the period between 1968 and 1970, in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and during the period when Shelest was permitting dissident writers a measure of latitude. Shcherbitsky's campaign for ideological conformity has put the dissidents on the defensive, but they have not been completely silenced and the reintroduction of more draconian measures may have radicalized them. (See page 19.)

A geographic and sociological breakdown of dissidents reveals that dissent is not completely confined to the intelligentsia, or to one section of the Ukraine. Although nationalism has always been stronger in West Ukraine, particularly in Galicia, in recent years dissent seems to have been on the rise in the cities of East Ukraine as well. And although the bulk of Ukrainian dissidents are intellectuals, Ukrainian nationalism probably has a greater popular base than Russian liberal dissent. On a few recent occasions workers have engaged in strikes with nationalist overtones, but cooperation between workers and intellectuals is doubtless impeded by the general failure of the nationalist intelligentsia to articulate lower class grievances concerning living standards and material welfare. Overt nationalism seems to remain an urban phenomenon; if nationalist disturbances involving the peasantry have occurred in recent years, we do not know about them. Larger portions of the

intelligentsia, however, have been involved in protests since the 1960s. This period witnessed the emergence of a new type of nationalist dissent, avowedly Marxist in orientation, which appealed to new Soviet elites for whom traditional Ukrainian nationalism seemed outdated.

The case of the Ukrainian dissidents is strengthened somewhat by support from other dissident elements in Soviet society. Recent years have seen a gradual convergence between the aims and tactics of the Ukrainians and other dissident groups, and a diminishing of old hostilities. The Ukrainians have received some cautious support from the Jews, and Soviet propagandists have taken to charging collusion between "Zionists" and Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalists." More important, Russian liberal dissidents, in the past lukewarm or hostile toward Ukrainian separatist sentiments, have shown increased sympathy for Ukrainian aspirations, and Christian dissent, particularly that of the Uniates, continues to reinforce Ukrainian nationalism.

Another variable is the degree of external support for Ukrainian nationalism. As the regime's detente policies make it increasingly vulnerable to criticism from "the other shore," and open up channels of communication between the Soviet Union and the West, organized protest of Ukrainian emigres in the United States and Canada becomes a potential shield for Ukrainian dissidents, and could perhaps encourage them to engage in bolder acts of dissent. The Ukraine is even more susceptible to East European influence, due to the historical association of West Ukraine with bordering East European countries, and the polyglot character of the affected populations. If discontent in the Ukraine mounted sufficiently to create a "revolutionary situation," a revolt in Eastern Europe could have a catalytic effect. Evidence that this level of discontent has not been reached is found in the events of 1968, when what was probably widespread sympathy for the Czechoslovaks created enough unrest in the Ukraine to make Party officials jittery, but to our knowledge did not result in any violent incidents of a serious nature. A successful revolution in Czechoslovakia might have a more jolting effect on the Ukraine, but to speculate about this is to call in the unforeseen to account for the remote.

The fear that in the event of war with China the Ukraine might try to break away has been voiced by Russian dissident Andrey Amalrik and is evidently shared by some high Soviet Party officials.[135] In recent years the PRC has stepped up its efforts to exploit the Ukrainian nationality problem by producing propaganda about Russian repression and by making contacts with Ukrainian emigre groups. A long drawn out and debilitating military encounter with the Chinese might well stimulate Ukrainian fractionalism yet it is unlikely that Ukrainian nationalists would side with the Chinese. Ukrainian dissidents dislike the Chinese regime more than the Soviet one; the only references to Maoism in Ukrainian *samizdat* are negative ones. Nationalism in the Ukraine appears to be waxing rather than waning, but a serious separatist effort is not in sight.

Even if the Ukrainians resented Russian domination as greatly as do the East Europeans, at least two major factors make the Ukrainian situation different from that of Poland or Czechoslovakia. First of all, the Ukraine has no national military units of its own. The various Soviet nationalities are thoroughly and deliberately integrated in the Soviet military; troops stationed in the Ukraine probably do not contain a higher than proportionate percentage of Ukrainians. Secondly, although the Ukrainian Party and government are in the hands of native Ukrainians, if put to the test they would probably by-and-large cast their lot with the regime. The leaders of the Ukrainian Party are more completely integrated into the Soviet system than were their counterparts in Czechoslovakia, and the system has been good to them. The central regime has accorded Ukrainian Party apparatchiks career advantages perhaps sufficient to prevent them from nurturing significant grievances.

Yet the Ukrainian Party has not been completely free of nationalist tendencies. These most frequently take the form of economic localism. But unless the case of Shelest be regarded as an aberration—and it is unlikely that he would have taken the stands he did without the support of important segments of the Ukrainian Party—nationalist tendencies may continue to be manifested in other attitudes. These may include support for schemes of political decentralization, relative leniency toward dissident

writers, and a general unwillingness to accede to the claim of Russian superiority in all things. Attitudes toward nationalism seem to be dependent in part on factional alignments, with the Dnepropetrovsk faction traditionally taking the lead in Russifying campaigns. On the basis of slim evidence, supported by common sense, we may presume that Party officials from the West Ukraine are more amenable to compromise with nationalist elements, although there are exceptions to this rule. Malanchuk, who hails from Lvov, and Ilnitsky, a native of Transcarpathia, are both fiery champions of Russification. Finally, the policies pursued by Ukrainian leaders are complicated by the presence of powerful patrons at the center who originally came out of the Ukrainian Party organization, and continue to meddle in Ukrainian affairs.

At present Shcherbitsky seems to have the Ukrainian Party in hand. He has purged those who dragged their feet in the ideological crackdown, and most of those who had obvious connections with Shelest. Yet Lyashko, Shcherbitsky's strongest rival, has long been identified as a critic of Brezhnev's economic policies, and his Donetsk faction is strongly represented in central Ukrainian Party and government institutions. Even Shcherbitsky has not always been a patsy or a yes-man in his dealings with central authorities.[136] He is so closely identified with Brezhnev that it would be difficult for him to do a volte-face on nationalities policy while Brezhnev remains in office, but if the political climate changes with a succession he might find it expedient to seek accommodation with nationalist elements in the Ukraine.

Under Brezhnev, the leadership has taken a hard line against all forms of Ukrainian nationalism. The leaders have cracked down on nationalist dissent and pronounced dogmas which appear to give official blessing to intensified Russification. They have also resisted proposals to decentralize economic administration, hinted at constitutional changes which might reorganize administrative units on economic rather than on nationality lines, and fired an independent-minded Ukrainian Party boss who stretched his authority and who seemed sympathetic to some forms of national "deviation." But campaigns to root out nationalism are hard to sustain for long periods, since they run the danger of exacerbating the problem they were intended to solve. And the vice of "localism" can be expected to rear its head periodically. A regional Party boss, whatever his nationality, is responsible for the economic performance of his union republic. He naturally lobbies for its interests in the allocation of resources.

Both after Stalin's death and after Khrushchev's ouster, the temporary diffusion of authority resulted in a relaxation of Russification efforts and a growth in assertiveness of union republic leaders. A similar relaxation may well follow Brezhnev's demise, but will probably be as short-lived as previous "thaws." On the whole, central authorities can be expected to continue a "muddle through" nationalities policy, to continue alternating spasms of repression with periods of malign neglect, in *ad hoc* efforts to keep a nagging problem under control without aggravating it. They may hope that long-range forces of economic modernization and social integration will do what out-and-out repression cannot—undercut nationalism by gradually eliminating the national differences which lie at its base.

If particularistic attitudes in the Ukraine and in other border regions persist, and come to be perceived as a mortal threat to the central regime, however, it is conceivable that a different approach might be adopted. The preponderance of the Great Russian nationality would make it difficult to establish a genuinely federal system, even if this were desired, just as the preponderance of Prussia made federalism in imperial Germany unworkable. Consequently, if concessions came, they would probably take the form of granting greater *de facto* autonomy to a few key nationalities, in an effort to buy their support for the system. By such an action nineteenth-century Austrians gave the Magyars a stake in the preservation of the Habsburg Empire and thus pacified them. Czechoslovakia provides an example of a Communist state in which major minorities have a degree of autonomy.

Yet the impulse toward Russian domination and the creation of a unitary state is strong. This urge has ideological as well as historical roots. While classical Marxism was as hostile to Russian nationalism as to minority nationalism, the main thrust of Soviet Marxist ideology has been toward centralized political and economic decision-making, and uni-

form cultural forms. Political centralization in a state where one nationality is larger than all the others combined, as well as being their historic master, inevitably results in domination by that nationality. Economic efficiency is enhanced if planners are able to treat the entire Soviet Union as a single economic entity, placing industries and assigning crops where most profitable or strategically useful, without regard for local desires. If culture and language are to be "internationalized" or standardized throughout the Soviet Union, Russian language and culture is the logical vehicle for this purpose. This process of "Russianization," by which Russian language and culture become universalized to serve the needs of a multi-national empire for communication and integration, can be defended on pragmatic and even ideological grounds. In practice, however, "Russianization" has led to "Russification," [137] the process by which the regime attempts to transform the minorities objectively and psychologically into Russians. Here considerations of realpolitik are probably paramount. Soviet Russian leaders doubtless have the usual prejudices of a dominant ethnic group, but they are not Great Russian chauvinists consumed with an emotional desire to convert alien populations; there is little indication of this sort of zeal in the leadership. Rather, it is the desire for more political control over the minorities which leads the central authorities to strive for the eradication of national differences, and has been among the main factors causing them to shy away from schemes of administrative or economic decentralization. Finally, the sheer weight of an old imperial tradition argues against systemic changes to relax central control over the provinces.

It is even possible that Soviet leaders might move in the other direction, toward a radical reduction of authority for the union republics, perhaps resulting in the formal abolition of the Soviet Federation, and open association of the Communist regime with traditional Russian nationalism. Some Soviet leaders today flirt with Russian nationalism because of its possible uses as a political tool, in the same way that the Tsars, not Pan-Slavs themselves, promoted Pan-Slav ideas for great-power purposes. During World War II Stalin discarded Marxist slogans in favor of nationalist ones with greater emotional appeal. With the waning of ideology as a force capable of motivating people and legitimizing the regime, some leaders may be casting about for a substitute "integrative myth" for the regime.

After the Russian Republic itself, there is no area of the Soviet empire more important to Moscow than the Ukraine. Neither the center nor the province are easy in their present relationship and in one way or another this is bound to change in coming years. This change may be gradual and evolutionary, but it may also result from a decision in Moscow that special measures are required. If so, the direction of change will more likely be toward greater centralization, rather than a devolution of power.

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68. John Kolasky, *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine; Viewpoint*, Discussion Bulletin issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Canada, I (Toronto, January 1968).

69. Reprinted in *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1968, pp. 82-84.

71. See Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichnyj, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis* (Canberra, Australia, 1970).

72. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 2 July 1968.

73. *Pravda*, 13 July 1968.

75. According to Jerzy Valenta of the University of Miami (Smrkovsky's memoir is not available to me). Also see *Soviet Analyst*, IV, No. 10, 8 May 1975.

76. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 20 July 1968; *Kommunist Ukrainy*, 1969, No. 1, pp. 85-93.

77. R. V. Burks, "The Decline of Communism in Czechoslovakia," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, II, No. 1, January 1969, p. 45.

78. State Airgram, 11 August (Moscow A-11 of 20 July 1974), LOU.

79. *Slovo Natsii* is translated as "A Word to the Nation," in *Survey*, XVII, Summer 1971, No. 3 (80), pp. 191-199.

80. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 26 March 1974. There is some disagreement about Solzhenitsyn's views on Ukrainian aspirations. See 31 December 1974 Memorandum for the Record, Unclassified.

81. M. S. Agursky, ed., *Iz-pod glyb: sbornik statey* (Moscow, 1974).

82. Roy Medvedev, *Kniga o sotsialisticheskoy demokraty* (Amsterdam, 1972), 324-328.

83. Quoted in *Khronika*, No. 22, 10 November 1971.

87. Reprinted in *Ferment in the Ukraine*, pp. 191-196.

88. Reprinted in the *Ukrainian Review*, XV, No. 1, Spring 1968, pp. 26-32.

89. *Khronika*, No. 27

91. Smoloskyp Publishing House press release, 31 January 1975; Kolasky, *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine*, pp. 98-102.

92. Izrail Kleiner, quoted by Zvi Gitelman in "The Social and Political Role of the Jews in the Ukraine," unpublished manuscript.

93. Moroz, "Among the Snows," *Boomerang*.

94. A detailed study of the relation of factionalism to nationalism is "Moscow and the Ukraine: Nationalism and Dissent, 1963-73," issued 27 June 1974,

96. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 8 June 1971.

99. FBIS Daily Report, 21 October 1969, from Kiev domestic service.

100. FBIS Daily Report, 25 June 1971, from Kiev domestic service.

101.

Daily Telegraph, 30 December 1972.

103. See Vsevolod Holubnychy, "Some Economic Aspects of Relations Among the Soviet Republics," in Erich Goldhagen, *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union* (New York, 1968), pp. 50-121; G. B. Yakusha, *Tekhniko-ekonomicheskie osnovy razvitiya elektroenergetiki ekonomicheskikh rayonov Ukrainskoy SSR* (Kiev, 1965); *Ekonomika radyanskoy Ukrainy*, No. 10, 1968, p. 40; *Pravda*, 5 August 1964.

104. *Political Diaries*, JPRS L/4160-1, p. 68.

105. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 18 April 1972; *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 20 November 1972.

106. *Chornovil Papers*, p. 72.

108. *Literaturna Ukraina*, November 1966.

109. *Ukrainsky Visnyk*, No. 6, March 1972, Document 8.

110. *Viewpoint* (Toronto, January 1968); *Literaturna Ukraina*, 6 September 1968.

111. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 19 May 1971.

112. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 16 March 1966.

117. *Sovetskaya kultura*, 4 June 1968.

119. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 30 April 1971

120. Kolasky, *Two Years*, p. 206.

121. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 9 November 1973.

122. Petr Yu. Shelest, *Ukraino nasha Radyanska* (Kiev, 1970), pp. 20, 21, 22, 29, 30. The offensive passages were largely confined to the section dealing with history.

124. *Kommunist Ukrainy*, No. 4, 1973, pp. 77-82.

125. *Kommunist Ukrainy*, No. 5, 1973, pp. 21-41.

126. Smoloskyp press release, 31 January 1975.

127. *Partinaya zhizn*, 1973, No. 14, July. For a detailed analysis see Yaroslav Bilinsky's unpublished "The Communist Party of the Ukraine After 1966."

128. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 15 May 1975.

129. See Malanchuk's treatise on Ukrainian history in *Zhovten*, 1972, I-V.

131. Franko's recantation in *Radyanska Ukraina*, 2 March 1972.

132. *Ukrainian Weekly*, 18 August 1973; *Svobada*, 9 August 1973.

133. See Shcherbitsky's remarks at a December 1968 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in *Izvestiya*, 13 December 1968.

134. See, for example, his *Pravda* article of 31 October 1972.

135. Andrey Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* (New York, 1970), p. 63;

136. Shcherbitsky is reported to have openly criticized Khrushchev's bifurcation of the Party into agricultural and industrial sectors.

137. The terms are those of Vernon Aspaturian. See his "The Non-Russian Nationalities," in Allen Kassof, *Prospects for Soviet Society* (New York, 1969).

[redacted]